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INTRODUCTION
The age-old maxim, inter ana silent leges ("in times of war, the
laws are silent") often applies to situations in which states perceive
their vital interests to be involved,' and has found a contemporary
expression in Dean Acheson's famous utterance that "[t]he survival
* Andreas Laursen, The European University Institute, Florence, Italy.
1. See ABRAM CHAYEs, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS: INTERNATIONAL CRISES
AND THE ROLE OF LAW 1 (1974) (citing the Cuban missile crisis as an example of

such a situation where vital interests of the state were threatened).
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of states is not a matter of law."' Despite this acknowledgement,
states traditionally have not been able to escape community
judgment, especially in a variety of non-judicial fora,3 when using
force for self-defense or national survival.
In the twenty-first century, the legal merits of a state's decision to
use force (lus ad bellum) and the actual implementation of such a
decision (jus in bello) are likely to be of concern to "third parties"
other than the "persuasive," but rather ineffectual college of
international lawyers.4 Today, judicial bodies are increasingly likely
to scrutinize decisions to resort to force and other forms of hostilities.
Among recent international incidents involving the use of force, the
NATO bombing campaign against the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia ("F.R.Y."), Operation Allied Force ("OAF"), has been
and continues to be subject to scrutiny in a variety of international
5
fora, including international courts.
2. Dean Acheson, Remarks, 57 PROC. AM. SOCT'Y INT'L L. 14 (1963) ("The
propriety of the Cuban quarantine [was] not a legal issue. The power, position and
prestige of the United States had been challenged by another state; the law simply
does not deal with such questions of ultimate power-power that comes close to
the sources of sovereignty.").
3. See OSCAR SCHACHTER, INTERNATIONAL. LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTIci
138 (1995) (discussing international scrutiny of the defensive measures taken by
states, focusing on armed force even when used in self-defense).
4. See Oscar Schachter, In Defense of International Rules on the Use of
Force, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 113, 121-22 (1986) (detailing the importance of third
party judgments in the appraisal of the legitimacy of a state's decision to use armed
force); see also Oscar Schachter, The Invisible College of International Lawyew,
72 N.W. U. L. REV. 217, 217-218 (1977) (discussing the role of international
lawyers through the metaphor of an invisible college). At its ninety-fifth annual
meeting, the American Society of International Law reviewed the past, present,
and future status of an "increasingly visible college." American Society of Int'l
Law, 95th Annual Meeting, The Visible College of InternationalLaw, available at
http://www.asil.org/am2001.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2002). Among the
condemnations of NATO from "world public opinion" is "The Commission of
Inquiry to Investigate U.S./NATO War Crimes against the People of Yugoslavia."
On June 12, 2000, the Commission found political and military leaders from
NATO guilty of war crimes. Id. The chief prosecutor was the former U.S. Attorney
General and founder of the International Action Center, Ramsey Clark. See
International Action Center, War Crimes Tribunal Finds U.S. and NATO Guilt '
(discussing the final judgment of the commission of inquiry to investigate U.S. and
NATO
war
crimes
against
the
citizens
of
Yugoslavia),
at
http://www.iacenter.org/warcrimes/wct2000.htm (last modified June 12, 2000).
5. See, e.g., infra notes 10-20 and accompanying text (analyzing the depth of
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NATO's OAF campaign against the F.R.Y. began on March 24,
1999 and was suspended on June 10, 1999.6 During this period,
NATO planes made approximately 38,000 sorties, of which around
one-third were actual attack missions, and delivered 23,614 pieces,
totaling around 6,000 tons of munitions. Approximately thirty-five
percent of these were Precision Guided Munitions.7 Although other
figures have been raised, there appears to be general agreement that
approximately five hundred Yugoslav civilians were killed during
the seventy-eight day campaign. I Of these, two-thirds were killed in
judicial scrutiny of the NATO campaign in Kosovo).
6. See NATO-Statement by the Secretar General on Suspension of Air
Operations, in THE Kosovo CONFLICT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN
ANALYTICAL DOCUMENTATION 1974-1999 309 (Heike Krieger ed., 2001)
(announcing the suspension of NATO's air operations in Yugoslavia).
Subsequently, General Clark, the NATO commander, issued the order to suspend
the bombing on June 10, 1999, at 3:36 PM. See WESLEY CLARK, WAGING
MODERN WAR: BOSNIA, KOSOVO AND THE FUTURE OF COMBAT 373 (2001)
(providing a narrative of General Clark's order to end the air operations).
7. See NATO Official Report, Kosovo One Year On: The Conduct of the Air
Campaign [hereinafter NATO Report] (discussing the selection of targets and the
combat
sorties
flown
by
Allied
Forces),
available
at
http://www.nato.intfkosovo/repo2OOO/conduct.htm (last modified Oct. 30, 2000);
W.J. Fenrick, Targeting and Proportionaliy during the NA TO Bombing Campaign
against Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 489 (2001) (noting the percentages for
precision guided munitions in Yugoslavia). The bombing campaign was expanded
during its operation from the original fifty-one targets and 366 aircraft to just short
of one thousand targets and around nine hundred aircraft. CLARK, supra note 6, at
425.
8. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, CIVILIAN DEATHS IN THE NATO AIR
CAMPAIGN 5 (2000) [hereinafter HRW REPORT] (estimating that between 489 and
528 civilians were killed during the bombing campaign); see also NATO Report,
supra note 7 (quoting and adopting the Human Rights Watch's estimate of
causalities). In a memorandum to the British Parliament, House of Commons, the
Serbian Information Center estimated that 1,500 civilians were killed and 8,000
injured, while the Serbian Unity Congress "flatly refute[d] the figure of 500
civilians killed" and estimated the real number to be 2.193 casualties. See Select
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Memorandum Submitted by Serbian Information,
app. 27, para. 9 (discussing the extent of the damage caused by armed
intervention), available at http://vwv.publications.paraliament.uk/pa/ cm 199900/
cmselect/cmfaff/28/28ap41.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2002); Select Committee on
Foreign Affairs, Memorandum submitted by Serbian Unity Congress, app. 38,
para. 15 (refuting the estimates given by NATO and Humans Rights Watch of
civilians killed during the bombing of Yugoslavia),
available at
http://www.parliament.the-stationary-office.co.uk/cgi-bin/htm (last visited Jan. 24,
2002).
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only twelve incidents. 9
Several organizations and international bodies have severely
criticized NATO's bombing campaign. Most prominently, at least
among judicial investigations, is the case at the International Court of
Justice ("I.C.J."), assessing the legality of OAF."' On April 29, 1999,

9. See HRW

REPORT,

supra note 8, at 5 (concluding that "twelve incidents

accounted for 303 to 352 civilian deaths").
10. The issue of humanitarian intervention has generated an overwhelming

amount of literature: See Editorial Comments: NATO's Kosovo Intervention, 93
AM. J. INT'L L. 824, 824-862 (1999) (discussing the topic of humanitarian
intervention and including contributions from Louis Henkin, Richard Falk, and W.
Michael Reisman); Bruno Simma, NATO, the U.N. and the Use of Force: Legal
Aspects, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1, 14-20 (1999) (discussing the threat or use of force
by NATO without Security Council authorization); Antonio Cassese, Ex iniuria ils
oritur: Are We Moving toward International Ligitimation of Forcible
HumanitarianCountermeasuresin the World Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23,
24-27 (1999) (arguing that NATO's actions in Yugoslavia are illegal under
international law but suggesting that under certain circumstances, a group of states
may be able to use force without U.N. authorization in order to prevent large scale
atrocities);
Antonio Cassese, A
Follow Up: Forcible Humanitarian

Countermeasures and Opinion Necessitatis, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 791, 792-799
(1999) (examining the views expressed by states during and since the Kosovo
conflict); Kosovo: House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee 4th Report, June
2000, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 876, 877-943 (2000) (compiling the views of Ian
Brownlie, Christine Chinkin, Christopher Greenwood, and Vaughan Lowe, all of
whom presented memoranda to the British House of Commons regarding the
NATO action in Yugoslavia); SIMON CHESTERMAN, JUST WAR OR JUST PEACE?
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2001) 7-20 (analyzing
the use of war to achieve humanitarian goals); NICHOLAS J. WHEELER, SAVING
STRANGERS: HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY (2000)

242-285 (discussing the limits of humanitarian in Kosovo). See generallv Till;
DANISH INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION:

LEGAL AND POLITICAL ASPECTS (DUPI 1999) (reporting on the legal and political

aspects of intervention in situations where states cause conflicts which have
humanitarian consequences affecting the whole international community); TII,
[DUTCH]
ADVISORY COUNCIL ON
COMMITTEE ON ISSUES OF PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL
INTERNATIONAL

AFFAIRS,
ADVISORY
LAW, HUMANITARIAN

INTERVENTION (2000) (discussing generally humanitarian intervention and
specifically the policy goals of the Netherlands); THE INDEPENDENT
INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION ON KOSOVO, THE KOSOVO REPORT: CONFLICT,
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE, LESSONS LEARNED [hereinafter THE Kosovo REPORTI

(2000) (reporting on the armed conflict and the humanitarian aspects of the conflict

in

Kosovo); THE COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION: CRAFTING A WORKABLE DOCTRINE: THREE OPTIONS PRESENTI)
AS MEMORANDA TO THE PRESIDENT (2000) (suggesting appropriate United States
policy for humanitarian intervention).
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the F.R.Y. instituted proceedings before the I.C.J. against ten NATO
member states, accusing them of violating the international legal
obligation not to use force against another state." The F.R.Y. also
filed a request for interim measures of protection, asking the Court to
order a halt to the bombing. On June 2, 1999, the Court refused to
issue such an order because it found that it lacked prima faicie
jurisdiction in eight of the cases. 2 With regard to two of the cases,
against Spain and the United States, the Court held that it manifestly

lacked jurisdiction, and these two cases were removed from the list. 3
The remaining eight states have subsequently presented their
arguments concerning the jurisdictional issue to the Court. The
F.R.Y. was originally given until April 5, 2001 to respond, but this

deadline has since been extended until April 5, 2002."4

11. See, e.g., Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.K.),
1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at I.C.J 1999 WL 1693064; Case Concerning
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belg.) 1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at
1999 WL 1693067; Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v.
Can.), 1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at 1999 WL 1693068; Case Concerning
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Neth.), 1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at
1999 WL 1693069; Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v.
Port.), 1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at 1999 WL 1693070; Case Concerning
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain), 1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at
1999 WL 1693071; Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Fr.),
1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at 1999 WL 1693250; Case Concerning Legality of
Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Italy), 1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at 1999 WL
1693066; Case Concerning Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.). 1999
1.C.J. (June 2), available at 1999 WL 1693065; Case Concerning Legality of Use
of Force (Yugoslavia v. F.R.G.), 1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at 1999 WL
1693596; (identifying Belgium, Canada, France, Gernmany, Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States as the states which the
F.R.Y. has instituted actions against).
12. See JIANM1NG SHEN, The I.CJ.'s Jurisdiction, in TIlE LEGALITY TO USE
FORCE CASES 480-95 (Sienho Yee & Tieya Wang eds., 2001) (critiquing the
I.C.J.'s decision).
13. See Case Concerning the Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Spain),
1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at 1999 WL 1693071; Case Concerning the Legality
of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. U.S.), 1999 I.C.J. (June 2), available at 1999 WL
1693065.
14. Considering the change of government in the F.R.Y., the future of the cases
is at present unclear. See Yugoslav Sees Closer Ties To US. Soon, WASII. POST,
Nov. 6, 2000, at A31 (stating that the new leadership in the F.R.Y. will likely
foster stronger ties with Europe and the United States), available at 2000 WL
25426539.
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In a separate case, several family members of individuals killed
during NATO's attack on the Serbian television station ("RTS") filed
a separate claim entitled Bankovic and Others v. The Contracting
States, 5 at the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") in
Strasbourg.
In addition to many other judicial initiatives,' 6 there were attempts
to investigate and prosecute NATO leaders and personnel at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
("ICTY"). The Office of the Prosecution ("OTP") at the ICTY
received several requests to investigate NATO conduct during
Operation Allied Force. Among these, was a request sent to Chief
Prosecutor, Louise Arbour, from Professor Michael Mandel of
Osgoode Hall Law School, on behalf of a number of international
lawyers.' 7 On May 14, 1999, the chief prosecutor decided to establish

15. The European Court of Human Rights received the complaint, Application
no. 52207/99, on October 21, 1999. See infra notes 132-164 and accompanying
text (analyzing the case before the ECHR). See Nicolas Rufford & Emily Milich,
Families to Sue Britain over Belgrade Blitz, THE SUNDAY TIMEs (London), July
16, 2000, at 32 (summarizing the details of the suit); Serbs Take Britain to Court
over NATO Bombs, THE ELECTRONIC TELEGRAPH. July 17, 2000 (discussing the
families' claim that the attack on the television station violated international law),
availableat www.telegraph.co.uk (last visited Jan. 24, 2002); The Belgrade Centre
for Human Rights, Press Briefing: Bankovic v. NATO States, available at
www.bgcentar.org.yu (last visited Oct. 11, 2000).
16. Among other initiatives, a Dutch organization, the Permanent Commission
with Regard to (Dutch) War Crimes Against Yugoslavia, has attempted to use
Dutch courts to force the Dutch government to cease participation in Operation
Allied Force. N.M.P. Steijnen, The First Experiences with Legal Action Against
NATO War Crimes Before Domestic Courts in the Netherlands, 51 REV. OF INT'L
AFF. 45, 45-48 (2000). In September 2000, NATO heads of governments were
"prosecuted" and "convicted" at the District Court in Belgrade. See Hearing at
Trial of NATO Leaders Starts, TANJUG, Sept. 18, 2000 (discussing the trial of
NATO
leaders
held
in
absentia),
available
at
http://www.kosovo.com/news/kfn00918.html
(last visited Jan. 24, 2002). A
number of the accused, including SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe)
General Wesley Clark, were sentenced to twenty years in prison in absentia. Id.
17. See Notice of the Existence of Information Concerning Serious Violations
of International Humanitarian Law Within the Jurisdiction of the Tribunal;
Request that the Prosecutor Investigate Named Individuals for Violations of
InternationalHumanitarianLaw and Prepare Indictments Against Them Pursuant
to Articles 18.1 and 18.4 of the Tribunal Statute, May 6, 1999 (requesting an
investigation by the Tribunal), available at http://counterpunch.org/complaint.htnil
(last visited Jan. 24, 2002). Louise Arbour was professor of law at Osgoode Hall
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a Committee to evaluate the accusations against NATO and to advise
her of the need for a formal investigation." The Committee delivered
its report at the end of May 2000.' 9 On June 2, 2000, Carla del Ponte,
Arbour's successor, informed the U.N. Security Council that she
intended to follow the recommendations in the Report to not initiate

a formal investigation. 2
The OTP subsequently made its report public ("OTP Report"). '
The OTP Report deals withjus in bello questions, such as damage to
the environment in the F.R.Y., the use of depleted uranium and
cluster bombs, and the question of target selection.' In addition, the
OTP Report subjects five individual attacks to specific evaluation.2
Two prominent non-governmental
organizations ("NGOs"),
2
4
Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch,2 also issued

Law School before becoming a judge. She was subsequently appointed chief
prosecutor at the ICTY.
18. See FinalReport to the Prosecutorby the Comnnittee Establishedto Review
the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia. para. 3
[hereinafter OTP Report] (setting forth the Tribunal's statute allowing the
prosecutor to initiate investigations and the chief prosecutor's May 14, 1999
decision to establish a committee to assess the allegations against NATO),
available at http://Yrwv.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato06l300.htm (last visited Jan. 24,
2002).
19. See id. (recommending "that no investigation be commenced by the OTP in
relation to the NATO bombing campaign or incidents occurring during the
campaign").
20. See Charles Trueheart, U.N. Tribunal Rejects Callsfor Probe ofIVA TO: No
Kosovo War Crimes Found, WASH. POST, June 3, 2000, at A9 (reporting on the
chief prosecutor's decision to follow the committee's recommendation not to
initiate an investigation), availableat A092000 WL 19612391.
21. See OTP Report, supra note 18.
22. See id. paras. 14-27 (analyzing whether environmental damage and the use
of certain types of weapons constituted war crimes).
23. See id. paras. 57-89. The Report briefly discusses the linkage between the
law concerning recourse to force and the law concerning how force is used. Id.
paras. 30-34.
24. See AMNESTY
INTERNATIONAL,
NATO/FEDERAL
REPUBLIC
OF
YUGOSLAVIA "COLLATERAL DAMAGE" OR UNLAWFUL KILLINGS? VIOLATIONS OF
THE LAWS OF WAR BY NATO DURING OPERATION ALLIED FORCE (2000)
[hereinafter AMNESTY REPORT] (providing case studies and background
information on the violations of the laws of war during Operation Allied Force).
25. See HRW REPORT, supra note 8, at 3-6 (providing case studies and
background on the crisis in Kosovo).
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substantial reports dealing with the conduct of OAF.
Although comparable in subject matter, the OTP Report can
reasonably be identified as the most "important" of the three .26 The
possible conclusions of the OTP Report would have had further
reaching consequences for the investigated states, the ICTY,
international humanitarian law, and international criminal law.
Viewing the mandates of the three organizations can briefly highlight
the qualitative difference, not in legal wisdom but in potential reach
and influence. Human Rights Watch's mandate is to investigate and
expose human rights violations and hold abusers accountable.27
Amnesty International works broadly to promote adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other internationally
recognized human rights instruments. 8 Their most formidable
"weapons" are information campaigns. Juxtaposed to these
mandates, the ICTY has the authority to prosecute individuals who
have committed serious violations of international humanitarian law
in the former Yugoslavia. 9 States are obligated to cooperate with the

26. Indeed, a number of comparisons have been made among the three reports.

This is partly due to the fact that they were issued more or less at the same time but
primarily due to the differing conclusions reached by the reports. Among its
general conclusions, Amnesty International stated that "[i]n one instance, the
attack on the headquarters of the Serbian state radio and television (RTS), NATO
launched a direct attack on a civilian object, killing sixteen civilians. Such attack
breached article 52 (1) of Protocol I and therefore constitutes a war crime."
AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 24, at 25. In contrast, Human Rights Watch found
"no evidence of war crimes. The investigation did conclude that NATO violated
international humanitarian law." HRW REPORT, supra note 8, at 3. Finally. the
OTP Report concluded that the "[s]election of certain objectives for attack may be
subject to legal debate. On the basis of the information reviewed, however, the
committee is of the opinion that neither an in-depth investigation related to the
bombing campaign as a whole nor investigations related to specific incidents are
justified." OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 90.
27. See generally Human Rights Watch, Who We Are, What We Do (setting
forth the mission and activities of the Human Rights Watch Organization), at
http://www.hrw.org/about/whoweare (last visited Jan. 31, 2002).
28. See generally Amnesty International, Statute of Amnesty International
(establishing the scope and mission of the organization), available at
http://web.amnesty.org/weg/aboutai (last visited Jan. 31, 2002).

29. See

STATUTE OF THE

INTERNATIONAL

TRIBUNAL

FOR TH-E

FORMER

YUGOSLAVIA, art. 1 (2000) [hereinafter TRIBUNAL STATUTE] (setting forth the
competence
of
the
International
Tribunal),
available
at
http://www.un.org/icty/basic/statute.stat2000.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2002).
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ICTY in connection with the investigations and prosecutions.3 0
The differences in the mandates and authority between the two
NGO's and the ICTY have a number of implications, especially with
regard to who is held responsible."
Moreover, the three
organizations differ in the way each may be subject to varying
degrees of political or other extra-judicial influence that may affect
the conclusions of their reports.
A fundamental difference between the mandates is found in
Article One of the ICTY Statute, which enables the tribunal to
prosecute individuals. 2 As Benvenuti puts it,
State responsibility has a wide scope because it includes all violations of
[international humanitarian law] and, furthermore, it has a more
"objective" character; while individual responsibility has a narrower
scope because it includes only the "grave breaches" of [international
humanitarian law] and, furthermore, in this regard the role of the
3
subjective element of the conduct is much more relevant. '

With regard to the latter, the OTP report notes that "[t]he mens rea
for the offence is intention or recklessness, not simple negligence. '
It is therefore probable that the OTP report may conclude that
prosecution cannot be recommended because the subjective element
is judged to be negligence and therefore insufficient for prosecution,
even if a certain rule is considered to have been violated.
30. See id. art. 29 (mandating co-operation by states with the tribunal).
31. See infra notes 33-34 and accompanying text (contrasting the ICTY's
power to prosecute individuals with the mission and scope of the NGOs).
32. See TRIBUNAL STATUTE, supra note 29, art. 1 ("The International Tribunal
shall have the power to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of
international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
since 1991 ... ").
33. Paolo Benvenuti, The ICTY Prosecutor and the Review of the NA TO
Bombing Campaign Against the FederalRepublic of Yugoslavia, 12 EUR. J. INr'L

L. 503, 526 (2001).
34. OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 28. See also International Committee of
the Red Cross, Commentaries, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of victims of InternationalArmed

Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977, para. 3474, [hereinafter ICRC API
Commentaty] (discussing the need for wrongful intent or recklessness for
prosecution),

available

at

http://www,.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebCOMART?

OpenView&Start-=l&Count=30&Expand=5#5 (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
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Finally, it is worthwhile to briefly consider the differences
between the NGOs and the ICTY with regard to the potential for
political pressure. It is hardly fair to randomly accuse the OTP of
succumbing to political pressure, whether in the present case of the
NATO investigation or in any other case. On the other hand, one
ought not discount completely the political environment in which the
ICTY operates.35 Three of the states investigated by the OTP are
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and
have, in spite of the Tribunal's formal independence, significant
influence on its future. 36 The fact that NATO member states
constitute the core of the Stabilization Force ("SFOR") in Bosnia,
and subsequently the force in Kosovo ("KFOR"), means that the
force being investigated is the same force upon which the OTP and
the Tribunal is heavily dependent for arresting fugitives from
previous Balkan wars. In any case, it would be naive to completely
discount the political reality of the Tribunal.
One example is the initial indictment against Slobodan Milosevic,
which was completed in approximately fifty days during the conflict
between NATO and the F.R.Y. in 1999.17 Although some Western
observers viewed the indictment as a possible impediment to
negotiations between NATO and Milosevic, it is somehow difficult
to imagine that the indictment just happened to be finalized at that
particular time, that it just happened to be limited in content to the
conflict in Kosovo, and that it did not include the far more
substantial allegations related to Croatia and Bosnia.38
35. See generally U.N. ProsecutorDefends Her NA TO Decision, NAT' L POST,

June 14, 2000, at Al1 (summarizing the criticisms of the chief prosecutor's
decision not to initiate a criminal investigation into OAF), available at A 112000
WL 22979429.
36. See United Nations Security Counsel Members (listing the United States,

France, and the United Kingdom as permanent members of the U.N. Security
Council), at http://www.un.org/Docs/scinfo.htm#MEMBERS (last visited Feb. 16,
2002).
37. See Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic, II-99-37 (May 27, 1999). See also
Marlise Simons, Milosevic to Face Charges Covering Three Wars in Balkans,

N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2001 (discussing the additional charges issued against
Milosevic including genocide in the massacres in Bosnia and accusations of war
crimes in Croatia).
38. Louise Arbour, however, maintains that "nobody gave us this case."
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR:

KOSOVO AND BEYOND 119 (2000). In
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The focus of the present essay is an analysis of the treatment of the
NATO action by the OTP Report. After some brief general remarks
about the Report, this essay discusses the following three issues.
First, it discusses use of cluster bombs in the Yugoslavian conflict.
Next, the essay discusses two specific incidents that occurred during
NATO's bombing campaign: the bombing of the RTS in Belgrade
and the attack on a refugee convoy near Djakovica. In discussing
these incidents, the essay refers to the observations by Amnesty
International, Human Rights Watch, and others.
A number of additional issues covered by the OTP Report will not
be addressed: Hence, the essay does not discuss, for example,
whether the potential damage to the environment violated the laws of
armed conflict. 39 Furthermore, this essay will not address a number
of additional issues related to OAF, including deliberations in NATO
concerning the use of electronic or cyber warfare and the question
about a possible naval blockade of the Montenegrin coast in order to
cut off the oil supply to the F.R.Y.

I. GENERAL REMARKS ON THE OTP REPORT
Following the publication of the OTP Report, the issue became
one of authorship.4" Substantial parts of the Report's discussion of
the principles of warfare were drawn from an article written by

contrast, Simon Chesterman finds that "political considerations appeared to lie
behind the decision to indict President Milosevic" during the NATO air campaign.
Simon Chesterman, No Justice Without Peace? International Criminal Law and
the Decision to Prosecute, in CIVILIANS IN WAR 151 (Simon Chesterman ed.,

2001).
39. Soon after the termination of Operation Allied Force, the Balkans Task
Force (jointly set up by the United Nations Environmental Programme and the
United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat)) issued a report dealing
with the environmental consequences of the Kosovo conflict. See Balkan Task
Force, The Kosovo Conflict: Consequences for the Environment & Human

Settlements (discussing the state of the environment and human settlements in the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia before and after the conflict), available at
http://www.grid.unep.ch/btf/final/index.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2002).
40. See Michael Bothe, The Protection of the Civilian Population and NA TO
Bombing on Yugoslavia: Comments on a Report to the Prosecutor of the ICTY, 12

EuR. J. INT'L L. 531, 531-32 (2001) ("The members of this expert group have
remained anonymous, thus inviting educated guesses as to who is behind the report
of the group.").
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William Fenrick, Senior Legal Advisor at the OTP.4 One might
expect acknowledgement of this source, even if the OTP Report is
not an academic work. It is, however, hard to find anything
fundamentally wrong with such an approach. Indeed, one would
expect that the considerations of principles related to warfare and the
protection of civilians are universally applicable. Even so, the
missing acknowledgement is surprising, Considering the importance
of the OTP Report, one might also expect that resources are on hand
to research and write a new report, thus avoiding the "cut and paste"
method.42
Whether due to the "cut and paste" approach or not, the OTP
Report is incoherent. 43 Among other things, one may inquire why,
considering the Report is not an academic work, we are treated to
some of the criticism of the definition of a military target found in
the Additional Protocol I (1977) to the 1949 Geneva Conventions
("API"). This is particularly puzzling when the discussion is very
brief, and ends with the conclusion that the API definition is "the
contemporary standard which must be used when attempting to
determine the lawfulness of particular attacks."44 One may also ask
why the NATO campaign has to be considered in the context of
aerial bombardments during the Second World War.45
Furthermore, the Report exhibits a lack of consistency. 46 At one

41. See generally William J. Fenrick, Attacking the Enemy Civilians as a
PunishableOffense, 7 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 539 (1997) (detailing the various

principles of warfare).
42. Itis, in this context, somewhat remarkable and no doubt a sign of the times
that a private organization such as Human Rights Watch apparently is able to
invest more resources in the investigation of the occurrences in the F.R.Y. than is
the OTP.
43. See infra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (stating that the OTP Report
lacks consistency and questioning the report's research methodology and factual
conclusions).
44. OTP Report, supra note 18, paras. 40-42.
45. See id. para. 43 (comparing the NATO campaign to air attacks during
WWII). The lacking relevance of a World War II perspective is further emphasized
by the Report itself when it states that "technology, law and the public consensus
of what is acceptable, at least in demonstrably limited conflicts, had evolved by the
time of the 1990-91 Gulf Conflict." Id. para. 44.
46. See infifa notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
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point, it states that sixteen persons were killed during the attack on
RTS, but states elsewhere that "between [ten] and [seventeen] people
are estimated to have been killed."4 7 Similarly, the Report states that
"[w]hether the media constitutes a legitimate target group is a
debatable issue," but then finds that "the media as such is not a
traditional target category."4 These few examples illustrate a more
general failure of the Report to draw firm and clear conclusions.
Finally, one may question the proficiency and comprehensiveness
of the research into factual circumstances of the incidents that the
Report evaluates.49 In the introductory section, the Report lists the
materials that have been consulted and remarks that "the information
available was adequate for making a preliminary assessment of
incidents in which civilians were killed or injured.""0 According to
the Report, the F.R.Y. was not visited or asked to provide
information because no official channels of communication existed.5 '
The subsequent sentence is somewhat surprising and contradictory
when it states that the F.R.Y. "submitted a substantial amount of
material. 5 2 How was this possible if no channels of communication
existed between the OTP and the F.R.Y.? The Report further states
that "very little information" was accessible
concerning
"communication targets," such as the RTS. 3 It is difficult to
understand how the Report can reconcile these findings with the
statement that the amount of information was "adequate."

47. Id. paras. 9, 71.
48. Id. paras. 47, 55.
49. See generally id. (noting that the committee drafters considered, among
other sources, public NATO documents, I.C.J. documents, scholarly studies, and
newspaper reports in drafting the OTP Report).
50. Id. paras. 6-7 (stating that the committee relied solely on public domain
sources and documents in conducting research for the OTP Report).
51. See id. para. 7 (commenting that, although the committee did not visit
F.R.Y., it relied on reports by the Human Rights Watch in addition to NATO press
releases).

52. Id.
53. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 8 (observing that, in addition to
communication targets, the committee was unable to obtain sufficient information
on civilian residential targets, civilian power facility targets, and environmental

targets).
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II. CLUSTER BOMBS
During and after OAF, NATO was criticized for its use of cluster
bombs. 4 This criticism was directed partly at the actual use against
certain targets, such as the bombing near the city of Nis on May 7,
1999, where a number of civilians were killed, and partly at the high
dud rate of cluster munitions, which left an unknown number of
unexploded bombs scattered throughout Serbia and Kosovo."
The OTP Report's treatment of the use of cluster bombs is both
unsatisfactorily brief and incomprehensive in manner. 6 The
paragraph analyzing the issue draws three conclusions: (1) cluster
bombs are not illegal weapons; (2) individual unexploded bombs
from a cluster bomb are not legally comparable to landmines; and (3)
cluster bombs were not used during Operation Allied Force in a
manner similar to the Martic case, where cluster bombs were used
against civilians in the Croatian capital Zagreb. 7
While Amnesty International agreed that international
humanitarian law does not include cluster bombs among prohibited
weapons, the organization found that "NATO failed to meet its
obligations to take necessary precautions by using cluster weapons in
the vicinity of civilian concentrations, thereby violating the
prohibition of indiscriminate attacks under Article 51(4) and (5) of
Protocol I.""

54. See, e.g., Virgil Wiebe, Footprints of Death: Cluster Bombs as
Indiscriminate Weapons Under International Humanitarian Law, 22 MICII. J.

INT'L L. 85, 120-48 (2000) (examining and critiquing the negative repercussions of
cluster bombing campaigns through analysis of three case studies in Croatia,
Kosovo, and Cechnya).
55. See HRW REPORT, supra note 8, app. A (incident 48) (estimating that the

number of civilians killed at Nis was fourteen, and further estimating the total
number of civilians killed as a result of cluster bombing campaigns to be between
ninety and one hundred fifty); see also Ticking Time Bombs: NATO 's Use of
Cluster Munitions in Yugoslavia, I1 HUM. RTS. WATCH 6(D) (1999) (determining

that the average dud rate for cluster bombs is roughly five percent).
56. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 27 (conceding that, although there is

no specific treaty provision dealing with the use of cluster bombs, they must be
used in conformity with general treaty provisions governing the use of all
weapons).
57. See id.
58. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 24, at 59.
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The OTP Report does not consider whether NATO employed
cluster bombs in any manner different to the lAlartic case, which
might have been incompatible with international law." One could at
least expect that the OTP Report would initially find that NATO did
not intend to hit a hospital and a market place in Nis. NATO's
explanation for this incident was that the cluster bombs were aimed
at the airport near Nis but due to a malfunction, one or more
containers holding the bombs opened too soon after release from the
NATO aircraft, scattering the bombs over the cityY' This explanation
is parallel to the OTP Report's conclusion that civilians were not the
intended targets. 6' Even if is this is accepted, it does not necessarily
follow that NATO or NATO personnel do not have any
responsibility-criminal or other-for the deaths in Nis. This
possibility is never addressed in the OTP Report, in spite of Amnesty
International's conclusion that NATO did not take sufficient
precautions.62

III. THE TV STATION ATTACK
Early in the morning of May 23, 1999, NATO aircraft attacked
RadioTelevisija Srbije ("RTS") in the center of Belgrade. There was,
as Amnesty International puts it, "no doubt that NATO hit the
intended target. ' 63 The central questions in connection with this
controversial attack are: (1) whether the TV station constituted a
legitimate military target; and (2) if so, whether the number of

59. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 28.
60. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 24, at 57 (quoting Major General Jertz
who stated that, although analysts speculated that a technical malfunction or
inadvertent release may have caused the cluster bombs to miss their targets and
cause civilian casualties, the Department of Defense was unsure what specifically

caused the error).
61. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 27 (concluding that NATO's use of

cluster bombs was not analogous to the use of cluster bombs in Zagreb, which
were designed to terrorize and harm civilians).
62. See AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 24, at 59 (asserting that the fact of a
technical malfimction would not obviate the violation of international law because
the initiation of the bombing campaign during the day may have led to more

civilian casualties and, thus, may fail to satisfy the requirement of reasonable
precautionary measures to avoid civilian losses).

63. See id. at 46
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civilian casualties was proportional to the military advantage
expected from the partial or complete destruction of the TV station.
The key to answering the first question is found in Article 52 (2) of
the API:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects
are concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by
their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to
military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or
neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite
64
military advantage.

Hence, the first question to be addressed pertains to the purpose or
use of the RTS, i.e., the function at the specific time. It is possible
that the RTS had a dual role, functioning as a civilian television
station while at the same time playing some kind of military role,
presumably connected to military communications. As the OTP
Report puts it, "[t]o the extent particular media components are part
of the C3 (command, control and communications) network they are
military objectives. If media components are not part of the C3
network then they may become military objectives depending upon
their use. 65
In order to evaluate the attack, one may consider the following
three possibilities: (1) that the RTS was used for civilian
broadcasting, including propaganda, which often did not accurately
reflect objective facts but which in no way could be characterized as
incitement to international criminal activity, for example, genocide;
(2) that the RTS' broadcasts could be characterized as incitement to
genocide; or (3) that the RTS functioned as in situation (1)and, in
addition, had a military function.66
64. International Committee of the Red Cross, Protocol Additional to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection Q Victimis
of InternationalArmed Conflicts (Protocol I),Part IV, art. 57 (2) (June 8, 1977)
[hereinafter
Protocol
1]
available
at
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/
385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/f6c8b9fee14a77fdc12564 1e0052b079?Opc
nDocument (last visited Feb. 18, 2002).
65. OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 55.
66. Itis,of course, possible to imagine other combinations, such as the RTS
both inciting to genocide and having a military function. Such further
combinations, however, have not been seriously suggested at any point and are not
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A. RTS AS A PROPAGANDA ORGAN
A number of statements from NATO leaders and spokespersons
indicate that RTS was perceived as a propaganda tool.67 Amnesty
International refers to a meeting between the organization and
NATO officials during which the officials "insisted that the attack
was carried out because RTS was a propaganda organ and that
propaganda is direct support for military action."
Other examples include the British Minister for International
Development, Clare Short, who stated that "the propaganda machine
[RTS] which is prolonging the war and meaning more and more of
this brutality continues, is a legitimate target" and that "a propaganda
machine that creates false propaganda constantly is a legitimate
68
target and that's why it was hit."
United States Pentagon spokesman Kenneth Bacon stated that
"[RTS] has misreported on what's going on in a way that has, I
think, made it extremely difficult, impossible probably, for the Serb
people to grasp the full magnitude of the problem in Kosovo. ' 6 As
an example, he mentioned that the RTS characterized the Kosovar
delegation to the Rambouillet negotiations that preceded the
bombing campaign as "terrorists and drug dealers" while the station
failed to mention the ethnic cleansing taking place in Kosovo.7 °
Television stations ("the installations of broadcasting and
television stations") were included in a 1956 draft of API's definition
of "military targets."'" This inclusion is occasionally emphasized as
discussed further.
67. See infra notes 77-80.
68. See, e.g., Briefing by the InternationalDevelopment Secretar'. Ms. Clare

Short, and the Chief of Joint Operations,Admiral Sir lait Garnett, Apr. 23, 1999
[hereinafter
Short
&
Garnett
Briefing],
available
at
http://vv.kosovo.mod.uk/brief230499.hti'n (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
69. Department of Defense News Briefing, Apr. 23, 1999 [hereinafter DOD
Briefing],
available
at
www.dfnselink.mil/news/Apr1999/
t04231999_tO423asd.htnrl(last visited Feb. 17, 2002).

70. See id. (asserting that control of the media, as much as control of security
and military forces, is one of the central "pillars" of Milosevic's regime).
71. See ICRCAPI Commentary,supra note 34, para. 2002 n.3 (establishing the
Draft Rules for the Limitations of Dangers incurred by the Civilian Population in
Time of War).
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an indication that television stations generally constitute military
targets. It is important to note, however, that "even if [the potential
targets] belong to one of [the listed target] categories, they cannot be
considered as a military objective where their total or partial
destruction, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers no military
advantage."72
Furthermore, it is noteworthy that in the following year, the
International Red Cross abandoned the draft, which contained a list
of installations that are believed to be military targets, and
subsequently adopted a more abstract definition of a military target
found in the current version of the API. " Since 1956, the traditional
notion of what constituted a military target may have changed. 7"
Hence, the API draft from 1956 can only be considered of historical
interest today.
Few are probably inclined to deny that the state-run Serbian radio
and television stations were employed for propaganda and failed to
broadcast a truthful rendition of events related to Kosovo. 75 The
question, however, remains whether this alone made the RTS a
legitimate military target under API's definition. Does propaganda
provide an "effective contribution to military action" and would its
destruction offer a "definite military advantage?" In constructing an
argument for the inclusion of television stations in the definition of
military target, one might emphasize the central role of propaganda
during military conflicts in general, and perhaps specifically, in the

72. Id. See also Fenrick, supra note 7, at 496 (writing that the 1956 list
"included the installations of broadcasting and television stations provided that
they were of fundamental military importance").
73. See Fenrick, supra note 7, at 495 (concluding that a shift from a "listoriented" definition of military targets to a "situation dependant" approach would
likely result in a more limited class of defined military targets and presumably,

would lead to more limited conflict).
74. Developments could, of course, also have moved in the opposite direction,
becoming more permissive of attacks on broadcasting stations.
75. See, e.g., Bankovic and Others v. The Contracting States also Parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty, Complaint, Eur. Ct. H.R. 52207/99, para. 123 [hereinafter
Bankovic Complaint] ("There is no doubt that RTS was a State controlled media
and certain programmes output by RTS were used as propaganda tools."),
available at http://www.bgcentar.org.yu/dokumenti/e-bankovic2.pdf (last visited
Feb. 17, 2002).
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Kosovo conflict. 76 Most may, however, find that the inclusion of
propaganda as a military target will stretch the definition far,
possibly too far.7 7 Furthermore, it appears very difficult to quantify
the impact of propaganda from a certain outlet on the military
action.78
More importantly, there are potential threshold problems that will
arise if propaganda is deemed to be a military target.7' For example,
the issue of what constitutes propaganda and who will define it
comes to mind. If the Voice of America at times broadcasts official
editorials from the United States Department of State, reflecting the
official view of the U.S. government, does this constitute
propaganda?" Does it make a difference if the Voice of America
does not allow the Serbian government to broadcast similar
editorials? Does propaganda have to be false or incorrect? What
about withholding information? The Israeli media is partly subjected
to military censorship, which may prevent Israeli media outlets from
broadcasting information relating to a certain story. The general
rational behind this is state security. Does this fact make the Israeli
media a legitimate target? What if, in a hypothetical case, twenty
persons were killed in an incident and the censor allowed the
incident to be mentioned but either refused to disclose casualty
76. See generally Vaughan Lowe, International Legal Issues Arising in the
Kosovo Crisis, 49 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 934, 942 (2000) (conceding that

broadcasting stations serving only as media conduits for civilian audiences may
play a powerful role in support of the war effort).
77. See id. (noting the inherent difficulties in attempts at quantifying
contributions of e.g. propaganda to the war effort). See also George Ff. Aldrich,
Yugoslavia's Television Studios as Militar , Objectives. in I INTERNATIONAL

LAW FORUM DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 149-50 (1999) (concluding that
the RTS and other broadcasting stations did not, through their propaganda, make
an effective contribution to military action).
78. Compare Fritzsche case, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 326 (1947) (acquitting
Fritzsche, a German national who was charged with the commission of war crimes
for participating in Nazi broadcasts and disseminating Nazi propaganda), with
Streicher case, 41 AM. J.INT'L L. 293 (1947) (finding Streicher guilty of war

crimes for inciting persecution and unrest through participation in Nazi media
news dissemination).
79. See infra notes 94-106 and accompanying text (analyzing the inherent
difficulties in classifying media outlets as military targets).
80. See Felicity Barringer, Voice of America Under Pressureto Toe U.S. Line,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2001, at C11.
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figures or claimed that none was killed?
Generally, targeting propaganda outlets appears to be too openended and has the potential to substantially undercut the protection of
civilian objects. The OTP Report is equivocal on this point by
concluding that the legality of the attack on the RTS was "debatable"
if the justification was that the target was a propaganda organ.
B. GENOCIDE

A series of statements from NATO spokespersons conveyed the
organization's belief that the RTS encouraged atrocities against the
Kosovar-Albanian population and even incited genocide.' At the
Pentagon, U.S. officials stated that the "Serb TV [was] as much a
part of Milosovic's murder machine as his military...

".2

The

British had similar concerns, voiced by their Under Secretary of
State:
We are very clear that the station that was hit [RTS] recently was an
absolutely key part of the hate campaign from the Serbian regime.... So
we are not talking about an independent media in that sense, we are
talking about a core part of preparation of the Serbian people and the
confusion of the Serbian people as to actually the situation around the
country, what is actually happening in Kosovo, but even more importantly
pouring out racist attacks in a constant barrage in order to create the
background for the ethnic cleansing that has then taken
place, not just
83
here but in previous campaigns by the Serbian regime.

In spite of these and similar statements, the OTP Report
determined that "it was not claimed that the [Serbian TV- and radio
stations] were used to incite violence akin to Radio Milles Collines
during the Rwandan genocide, which might have justified their
81.

See ilfra notes 94-96.

82. See DOD Briefing, supra note 69 (observing that the Serbian television
broadcasts failed to convey an accurate portrayal of the nature of Milosevic's
"ethnic cleansing" campaigns).
83. Briefing bj the Under Secretary of State Mr. John Spellar, and The Deputy
Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments), Air Marshal Sir John Day. April 24, 1999
available at http://www.kosovo.mod.uk/brief240499.htm. (last visited Feb. 17,
2002). See also Short & Garnett Briefing, supra note 68 (affirming that "the
television station is a source of propaganda that is prolonging this war and causing
untold suffering to the people of Kosovo").
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destruction. 8' 4 In the complaint to the ECHR, the plaintiffs argued
that even though the British Ministry of Trade and Industry claimed
that RTS broadcasts "included propaganda inciting genocide and
racial hatred," there was no proof to substantiate these allegations."
Thus, while the question of incitement to genocide does not arise in

the context of the Serbian TV station, potential attacks against such
broadcasting facilities do, however, raise a number of difficult and
6
challenging problems in abstracto.1

Even if the definition of a military target found in API is accepted
as authoritative, it is very difficult to place institutions that incite
genocide within this definition. One author argues that "[there is, of

84. Compare OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 76 (contrasting NATO's belief
that the Yugoslav government used broadcast networks as a tool to "incite hatred
and propaganda" with more direct instances of incitement to encourage ethnic
violence), with Prosecutor v. Ruggiu, 2000 I.C.J. 16 (June 1)(finding defendant
Ruggiu guilty of using public radio broadcasts as a means for "incitement to
commit genocide"),
available
at
www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/cases/Ruggiu/
judgement/rug0600.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2002). Georges Ruggiu worked for
Radio Television Libre des Milles Collines. Id. On June 1, 2000, the Court
concluded:
Those acts [committed by Georges Ruggiu] were direct and public radio
broadcasts all aimed at singling out and attacking the Tutsi ethnic group and
Belgians on discriminatory grounds, by depriving them of the fundamental
rights to life, liberty and basic humanity enjoyed by members of wider
society. The deprivation of these rights can be said to have as its aim the
death and removal of those persons from the society in which they live
alongside the perpetrators, or eventually even from humanity itself.
Id. Based on this, the Tribunal found Ruggiu guilty "of the crime of direct and
public incitement to commit genocide and of crimes against humanity
(persecution)." Id.
85. See generally Bankovic Complaint, supra note 75 (invoking Article 2 (right
to life), Article 10 (freedom of expression), and Article 13 (the right to an effective
remedy) of the Geneva Convention against the NATO forces).
86. See generally Israeli Defense Forces, IDF Spokesperson 's Announcements,
Oct. 12, 2000 (detailing Israeli attacks against Palestinians radio and broadcast
facilities on the ostensible basis that these facilities were inciting violence). On
October 12, 2000, two reservists from the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), apparently
by mistake, entered the Palestinian controlled area near the West Bank city of
Ramallah. Id. Subsequent to being taken into custody by Palestinian police force,
they were lynched by a mob. Id. In retaliation, the IDF carried out a number of
helicopter borne attacks. Id. Among the targets were the Palestinian radio station,
the Voice of Palestine, because the station, according to the Israelis, "'played a key
role in the incitement [that led to the lynching of the two reservists]." Id.
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course, no necessary relationship between the use of a facility to
commit a war crime and the classification of that facility as a military
objective."87 On the surface at least, a broadcasting station that
incites genocide does not make an effective contribution to military
activities and its destruction would, therefore, not constitute a clear
military advantage. On the contrary, to the extent the armed forces
participate in the genocide, this would appear, from a cynical point
of view, to detract from their contribution to legal military efforts.
One could argue, however, that the genocide was an integral part
of the military campaign, in which case military "success" had to be
measured according to the number of civilian casualties from a
specific ethnic group. From such a perspective, the criteria of'
"effective contribution" would have been fulfilled. Even such a
distorted deliberation, however, would not account for "definite
military advantage" if the enemy regarded the genocide as being
without military significance.
As the above comments demonstrate, "extra-military" arguments
fit poorly within the context and terminology found in the API. In
addition, once such arguments are introduced, it would make it easier
for a military force to attack a broadcasting station that does not
incite genocide. Consider a revolutionary government that announces
over its radio stations that it intends to destroy all private property in
territory it has occupied. If such a policy is assumed to violate
Article 53 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, does said statement
make the radio stations legitimate military targets? Clearly, it does
not. One can argue that there is a huge difference between genocide
and the destruction of private property. This is beyond doubt, but the
point is that if "extra-military" arguments are introduced, it is
difficult, if not impossible to distinguish formally between the two
examples.
Based on the notion of a "generalized right to prevent th'e
continuing commission of crimes," one may, however, "suggest that
a facility which is being used to incite the commission of serious
violation of international humanitarian law or to provide the location
for the commission of such an offence may be lawfully attacked even

87. Fenrick, supra note 7, at 496.
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if it did not meet the criteria for a military objective.'"" Concepts
such as "some generalized right" are difficult for lawyers to
conceptualize and to use as justification, for example, of an attack on
a radio station. However, this proposal may be the best option at
present. The legitimate and moral goal of stopping genocide

outweighs the concerns related to conceptualization.
Specifically, in the context of humanitarian intervention such as
the Kosovo conflict, however, one may be able to suggest an

additional justification for attacking a broadcasting station that
incites genocide.8 9 This justification is based on a well-known legal
principle, in maiore minus, and assumes that jus ad bellum
considerations may aid and support the interpretation of the jus in
bello corpus. 90

The questions concerning the legality of resorting to the use of
force and the actual conduct of hostilities have traditionally been
separated.
It is a basic premise of the law of war (or of armed conflict) radically to
separatejus in bello frorijus ad belhm, a premise without which it would
be impossible to apply the fundamental principle that underlie the whole
edifice ofjus in bello, i.e., the principle of the equality of the parties.9'

88. Fenrick, supra note 7, at 497 (observing that the second objective seized by
anti-Milosevic protestors was the RTS, thus evidencing the fact that the broadcast
station served as a "symbol of the regime").
89. See infra notes 89-92 and accompanying text (analyzing alternative bases
for attacking media outlets that incite genocide).
90. See generally Cristopher Greenwood, Jus Ad Belluni and Jus In Bello in the
Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 247 (Laurence
Boisson Chazournes et. al. eds., 1999) (examining the dichotomy between the
application of the jus ad bellun and thejus in bello in the U.N. Advisory Opinion
on the permissibility of nuclear armament under existing legal norms).
91. George Abi-Saab, The Concept of 'War Crines," in INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE POST-COLD WAR 111 (Sienho Yee et. al. eds., 2001). See also Protocol1,
supra note 64, pmbl. (confirming that the Convention, along with the four 1949
Geneva Conventions, must be fully applied "... without any adverse distinction
based on the nature or origin of the armed conflict"); Theodor Meron, The
Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239, 241 (2000) (asserting
that "the separation between "jus ad bellum' and 'jus in bello' results in the
uniform, neutral application of the latter... and avoids.., preliminary disputes on
the character of the war as just or aggressive").
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The reason for this separation is to be found in the fact that
humanitarian law of armed conflict is intended to protect individuals,
primarily vulnerable and helpless individuals such as civilians, the
sick, and the wounded. Such a purpose is better achieved by avoiding
any considerations about how the conflict originated. Considering
this principled background, it would not, however, be unreasonable
to letjus ad bellum justifications, such as humanitarian intervention,
influence, or aid in the interpretation ofjus in bello rules, as long as
the goal and objective is a better, more comprehensive protection of
individual persons.92
The stated purpose of and justification for Operation Allied Force
was based on humanitarian intervention "to stop the killing in
Kosovo and the brutal destruction of human lives and properties; to
put an end to the appalling humanitarian situation that is now
unfolding in Kosovo," and was initiated in order to save the
Kosovar-Albanian civilian population from deportation, deprivation,
or worse. 93 If it is possible to justify a sustained bombing campaign
in order to stop genocide, it would appear, afortiori,to be justifiable
to take measures to halt incitement to genocide, as propagated by a
radio or television station.
C.

MILITARY FUNCTION

Surprisingly, it is difficult to find clear statements from NATO
alleging that the RTS had a military function. Amnesty International
quotes NATO officials as saying that the RTS was "used as radio
relay stations and transmitters to support the activities of the F.R.Y.
92. See Cristopher Greenwood, Self Defense and the Conduct of International
Armed Conflict, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY 273-88 (Y.
Dinstein ed., 1989) [hereinafter Greenwood, Self Defense] (recognizing the
connection between 'jus ad bellum" and 'j]us in bello" in his assertion that the use
of force for humanitarian purposes must be limited to what is necessary and
proportionate to achieving the humanitarian purposes of the operation). This
principle, Greenwood argues, necessarily restricts the range of what may be
lawfully attacked. See Cristopher Greenwood, International Law and the N/TO
Intervention in Kosovo, 49 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 926, 933 (2000); Greenwood,
supra note 90, at 265-66 (reflecting on the application of humanitarian norms to
the 1996 I.C.J. Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons).
93. Excerpts from Statement to the Press by the Secretary General of NATO,
Press Release 045 (1999), available at http:/!www.nato.int/docu/pr/1999/p99045e.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2002).
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military and special police forces."9' The OTP Report uses this
statement as proof of the RTS's military function." Amnesty
International, however, firmly maintains that NATO subsequently
emphasized that the RTS was attacked solely because it was an organ
of propaganda."
Likewise, Human Rights Watch appears to doubt that the RTS had
a military function.97 Furthermore, the complaint to the ECHR holds

that "there was and is no evidence that the RTS building in Belgrade
was, at any point, part of Milosovic's 'war machine"" and that "it
[had] never been claimed by the respondent Governments that it was
used to relay military communications."" The OTP Report quotes
NATO statements from April 27, 1999, four days after the attack,
indicating that the RTS did have a dual-use function. " General
Wesley Clark then stated, "As I said, it's essentially a dual-nature
system... military [radio] traffic is also routed through the civilian

system."' 01
The OTP Report clearly states the questions that are central to the
attack on the RTS. °2 The OTP Report, however, fails to conclude
94. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 24, at 47 (noting a discrepancy between
NATO comments regarding the targeting of RTS relay stations as part of
Milosevic's "media infrastructure").
95. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 76.
96. See Amnesty International, News Release-EUR 70129100, June 13, 2000:
Amnesty International's Initial Connents on the Review by the International
Criminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia of NA TO s Operation Allied Force
(reiterating the explanation given by NATO for the bombing of RTS).
97. See HRW REPORT, supra note 8 (contending that the RTS had a legitimate
public interest and was not merely a tool of the military regime).
98. Bankovic Complaint, supra note 75, para. 20.
99. Id. para. 178.
100. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 72 (stating that NATO officials
justified the attack in terms of the dual military and civilian use of the RTS).
101. NATO: NATO's Role in Kosovo, Press Conference, Comments by Jamie
Shea and General Wesley Clark, SACEUR, NATO HQ. Apr. 27, 1999, available
at
http://wwv.isn-lase.ethz.ch/cgi-bin/isn/. . .- 1999tv 10-I1999@'4-confer
@2-1999@2-&lang=en (last visited Feb. 2,2002).
102. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 55 ("To the extent particular media
components are part of the C3 (command, control and communications) network
they are military objectives. If media components are not part of the C3 network
then they may become military objectives depending upon their use.").
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whether and to what degree the RTS or its components were in fact
part of the C3 structure or had any other military function. The
Report also fails to determine whether the RTS was a legitimate
target according to the criteria in API. In fact, the OTP Report does
not even identify NATO's justification for its attack on the RTS.""'
The OTP Report states that the attack was legal to the extent that
NATO attempted to disrupt the F.R.Y.'s C3 network,"' whereas the
legality of the attack was "debatable" if it was justified only because
the RTS was a propaganda organ. 05
As mentioned above, the Committee behind the Report found that
it possessed enough information to make a sound evaluation. When
examining the most controversial attack during the entire campaign,
it should have been possible to determine whether the target was a
legal target or not.
D. PROPORTIONALITY

Quite a lot has been made of the fact that the attack only disrupted
the RTS's television broadcast for a few hours. 06 Critics note this
fact as proof that the bombing did not provide a "definite military
advantage."'0 7 This argument, however, appears to be based on a
confusion of various aspects of the attack. If it is assumed that
normal television broadcasts do not constitute a legitimate military
103. See id. para. 75 ("As indicated... the attack appears to have been justified
by NATO as part of a more general attack aimed at disrupting the F.R.Y.
Command, Control and Communications network ....) (emphasis added).
104. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 75 (stating that the attack was legally
acceptable "insofar as the attack was actually aimed at disrupting the
communications network..
105. See id.
para. 76.
106. See id. para. 78 (surmising that NATO realized attacking RTS would only
briefly interrupt broadcasting).
107. See Tania Voon, Pointing the Finger: Civilian Casualties of NA TO
Bombing inthe Kosovo Conflict, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. R[v. 1083, 1107 (2001)
(stating "that itisdifficult to see how such a short interruption could achieve a
degree of military advantage" given the short duration in which the RTS returned
to the air); Aaron Schwabach, NATO's War in Kosovo and the Final Report to the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 9
TUL. J.INT'L & COMP. L. 167, 182 (2001) ("Killing ten people, let alone
seventeen, to shut off a few hours of late-night television broadcasting seems
disproportionate.").
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target, then the duration of the interruption cannot influence the
legality of the attack. What is determinative is how the attack
influenced any military components or communications, which may,
in the first place, legitimize the attack. One may be able to draw a
conclusion based on an analogy to the amount of time it took to
restore the civilian television signal and assume that the restoration
of military communications would take a similar amount of time.
This, however, would appear to be mere speculation. Hence, it is not
particularly useful and does not further a legal analysis when
Amnesty International, for example, observes that "NATO
deliberately attacked a civilian object, killing [sixteen] civilians, for
the purpose of disrupting Serbian television broadcasts in the middle
of the night for approximately three hours. It is hard to see how this
can be consistent with the rule of proportionality."'' 5
Assuming that the RTS was a legitimate military target, the
subsequent question must concern whether the number of
casualties-sixteen civilian Serbs-was proportional to the military
advantage gained by destroying the TV station. API prohibits
indiscriminate attacks.0 9 Included among the types of attacks that are
considered indiscriminate is "an attack which may be expected to
cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated."'" The question of excess is most often referred to as the
principle of proportionality.
How are we to weigh the loss of sixteen lives vis-a-vis the military
advantage gained by the destruction of the TV station and the
resulting temporary disruption of military communication? The
treatment of this essential question in the OTP Report is confusing.
In reviewing the applicable law regarding target selection, the OTP

108. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 24, at 51. Fundamentally, the issue of
proportionality only arises with regard to attacks on military targets. A deliberate
attack on a civilian object can never be justified and the issue of proportionality
never enters into the equation.
109. See 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, openedfor signature Dec. 12, 1977, Art. 51(4), 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979).

110. Id. art. 51(5)(b).
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Report states that questions arising in the context of the
proportionality principle must be addressed on "a case by case
basis.""' This approach parallels the view that potential war crimes
are individual crimes that have to be evaluated case by case.' ' 2
Nonetheless, the OTP Report determines that when analyzing the
attack on the RTS, the legal evaluation of"the proportionality of the
attack should not be premised on a specific incident." ' ' This means
the individual attack on the RTS and the civilian casualties are not
the main focus. Rather, the attack on the RTS must be viewed as one
phase of "an integrated attack" against multiple objects. The legal
evaluation must take into account this plurality of targets, which
constitutes the overall strategic goal, the Yugoslav C3 structure."I4
If consistently applied, the logic presented by the OTP Report will
end by weighing the total number of casualties, around Five
hundred," 5 against the entire Operation Allied Force. Even if the
total number of civilian casualties was limited in light of the extent
and intensity of the bombing campaign, it is questionable whether
such a comparison is useful for anything. "6
An initial complaint is that the accumulation of targets in the OTP
Report, allegedly belonging to the same "integrated attack," is based
on a collection of NATO press releases." 7 The more serious
11.

See OTP Report, supra note 18, para 50.

112. See Benvenuti, supra note 33, at 519 ("Even specific and sporadic conduct
may have amounted to a war crime.").
113.

OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 78

114. See id. (including transmitter towers and electricity supplies as components
of the Yugoslav C3 structure).
115. See HRW REPORT, supra note 8, at 5 (estimating the number of civilian
casualties in the Yugoslav conflict).
116. See Dep't. of Def., Kosovo/Operation Allied Force After-Action Report,
Report to Congress, Dec. 12, 1999 (addressing the total number of casualties and
concluding that "[d]espite [the weather and terrain] NATO conducted the most
precise and lowest collateral damage air operation in history"), available at
www.defenselink.mil/pubs/kaar02O72000.pdf xiv (last modified Jan. 31, 2000):
THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 10, 183-84 (noting that the Commission was
impressed by the minor civilian damage relative to the magnitude and duration of
the war).
117. See generally OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 78 (describing the
formation of an integrated attack on numerous targets).
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problem, however, is whether it is permissible to dilute the
significance of a single attack by pouring it into the sea of integrated
attacks." 8 At least two aspects of this question must be addressed: (1)
the authority of the approach followed by the OTP Report; and (2) to
what extent the approach is acceptable.
1. The Kupreskic Case
According to the OTP Report, the foundation for the integrated
attack theory appears to be a somewhat backward interpretation of
dictum delivered by the ICTY Trial Chamber in the Kupreskic
case. 9 The Tribunal concluded that repeated, individual legal
attacks might be illegal because the described pattern of attacks
places the "lives and assets" of civilians in great jeopardy.' 20 The
OTP Report completely misconstrues the Trial Chamber's dictum by
concluding that it meant to compare the total number of casualties
with the overall goals of the military action.' 21 Thus, while the
Tribunal determined, in a hypothetical case, that a series of legal
attacks may be deemed illegal when accumulated, the OTP Report
stipulates that an attack that is illegal in and of itself (due to
excessive civilian casualties) becomes legal when viewed in the

118. See Benvenuti, supra note 33, at 524 (noting the Committee's view on the
necessity of watering down the specific attack on the RTS by viewing it in the
larger context of the war against the Yugoslav C3).
119. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16-T, at 207 (I.C.T.Y. Jan. 14,
2000) ("[fIn the case of repeated attacks, all or most of them falling within the gray
area between indisputable legality and unlawfulness, it might be warranted to
conclude the cumulative effect of such acts entails that they may not be in keeping

with international law."); see OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 52 (interpreting the
Kupreskic case). The Kupreskic dictum seems to echo Judge Lauterpacht's

reflections on "the imperceptible line between impropriety and illegality" in the
Voting Procedures Case, 1955 I.C.J. 67, at 120. See generally Benvenuti, supra
note 33, at 517 (concluding that the Committee misconstrued the statement of the
ICTY in the Kupreskicjudgment).
120. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, No. IT-95-16-T, at 207 (I.C.T.Y. Jan. 14,
2000).
121. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 52 (stating that the committee

interprets the Kupreskic judgment to refer to "'anoverall assessment of the totality
of civilian victims as against the goals of the military campaign"). The OTP Report
characterizes the Trial Chamber's statements as "'progressive" and implies that the
Trial Chamber was stating lexferenda rather than let"lata. Id.
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context of the "integrated attack" theory.12
This is a highly original use of precedence. For one thing, it raises
a serious issue of double standards at the tribunal. The accused in the
Kupreskic case, Croats from the former Yugoslavia, could be judged
according to the broad interpretation adopted by the Trial Chamber,
but when investigating the NATO countries, the OTP Report adopts
a significantly narrower standard, to the extent that the standards are
reconcilable at all. Moreover, it would appear to be untraditional for
a prosecutorial authority to undercut the court that may subsequently
decide the case.123 If a court has adopted a broad interpretation that
works to the detriment of the accused, prosecutors will rarely fail to
follow through. One possible explanation is, of course, that the
prosecutorial authority is looking for reasons not to prosecute.
2. Is the "IntegratedAttack" Approach Correct?
The next fundamental question relates to whether an attack, such
as the one against the RTS, should be judged individually or rather,
as implied by the OTP Report, be viewed in a larger context. A
number of authors advocate that the individual attack against the
individual target must be the point of concern. Bernard Brown, for
example, found that "both policy factors and the language of the
[articles of the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and
Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in
Armed Conflicts] support a 'case by case' interpretation of military
advantage."

24

122. Id. However, even if the OTP Report believes that the dictun is h"
ferenda, this would not reasonably justify the opposite interoperation.
123. See Benvenuti, supra note 33, at 517 (arguing that the "[c]ommittee must
not question the law as it is applied by the ICTY").
124. Bernard L. Brown, The Proportionality Principle in the Humanitarian Law
of Walfare: Recent Efforts at Codification, 10 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 134, 142
(1976) (writing before the final adoption of the API, which does not seem to alter
his observations). See also Schwabach, supra note 107, at 184 (criticizing the OTI'
Report for disregarding a basic tenet of human rights law: "that human lives have
value not only in the aggregate but also in the individual"); Randy W. Stone,
Comment, Protecting Civilians During Operation Allied Force: The Enduring
Importance of the Proportional Response and NATO's Use of Armed Force in
Kosovo, 50 CATH. U. L. REV. 501, 521 (2001) (explaining that the proportionality
principle requires the weighing of potential military advantage against civilian
casualties for every attack in a military operation).
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Such a case-by-case approach appears, however, to be too narrow
and unrealistic in practice. A number of states entered declarations
concerning the issue during the negotiations of API. Italy, for
example, noted that the evaluation of the military advantage, which
forms part of the principle of proportionality, must be considered on
the basis of "the attack as a whole and not in relation to each action
regarded separately."' 25 To this, the API Commentary replied,
"[t]hese statements, which all have the same tenor, seem redundant;
it goes without saying that an attack carried out in a concerted
26
manner in numerous places can only be judged in its entirety."'
This commentary does not, however, contribute to a more thorough
understanding of what "an attack carried out in a concerted manner"
includes. Does it cover the entire Operation Allied Force, as the OTP
Report intimates? In that case, the principle of proportionality is a
reality without any normative constraint or content.' -7
Therefore, it is hardly surprising that the API Commentary finds
that "[[Article 57 (2)(a)(iii)] like Article 51 ... is not concerned with
strategic objectives but with the means to be used in a specific
tactical operation."' 28 Louise Doswald-Beck, who partly accepts the
mentioned declarations, proposes a similar interpretation.' 9 This

125. ICRC API Conmmentary, supra note 34, para. 2218 n. 15.
126. Id.
127. See generally Schwabach, supra note 107 (criticizing "'casualty averaging"
as a method which will never deem a single incident resulting in civilian deaths as
disproportionate absent a larger scheme of incidents resulting in excessive civilian
deaths); William Fenrick, The Rule of Proportionalit ' in Protocol I in
Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 107 (1982) (stating that assessing a

military benefit on an overly broad basis may virtually preclude applying the
proportionality principle until the end of the war). Such a broad basis would make
it hard to make any meaningful evaluation at all.
128. ICRCAPI Commentary, supra note 34, para. 2207.
129. See Fenrick, supra note 41, at 548 (quoting Louise Doswald-Beck, THE
VALUE OF THE 1977 GENEVA PROTOCOLS FOR THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS,
reprinted in ARMED CONFLICT AND THE NEW LAW: ASPECTS OF THE 1977 GENEVA

PROTOCOLS AND THE 1981 WEAPONS CONVENTION 137. 156 (Michael A. Meyer

ed., 1989)). One is left wondering why the comments by Doswald-Becks, which
Fenrick finds particularly relevant, were not included in the OTP Report,
considering that substantial parts of Fenrick's article have been incorporated into
the Report. See also Greenwood, Self Defense, supra note 92, at 278-79 (referring
to the principle of proportionality found in Article 51 as imposing a "'requirement
of tactical proportionality"). Greenwood also operates with a strategic
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interpretation narrows the scale substantially, and Doswald-Beck
provides an example in which six military targets are considered as
one attack when weighing the military advantage and the principle of
proportionality. 30 This interpretation fundamentally differs from the
list of targets that the OTP Report suggests belong to the same
"integrated attack." The limitation to "a given tactical operation" is
both sound and reasonable as opposed to the "integrated attack"
approach adopted by the OTP Report, which, as pointed out,
logically will end up comparing the complete number of casualties to
the entire bombing campaign, thereby robbing the principle of
proportionality of any restraining power.
E. THE COMPLAINT TO THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Relatives of persons killed during the attack on the RTS have
made a complaint to the ECHR in Strasbourg. 3 ' The complaint asks
the Court to find that member states of NATO violated articles 2
(right to life), 10 (freedom of expression) and 13 (right to an
effective remedy) of the European Human Rights Convention ("the
132
Convention").
1. The Question ofAdmissibility
The initial question for the ECHR was whether the complaint was
admissible. 3 3 The answer to this question turned on the interpretation

proportionality, which by contrast, is derived from the overall justification [or the
use of force, i.e.,jus ad bellum.
130. See Fenrick, supra note 41, at 548 (quoting Doswald-Beck, supra note 129,
at 137, 156); see also Stefan Oeter, Methods and Means of Combat, in Tiil,
HANDBOOK OF HUMANITARIAN LAW IN ARMED CONFLICT 105, 179 (Dieter Fleck

ed. 1995) (adding his voice in favor of a wider contextual evaluation). The breadth
of Oeter's evaluation, however, remains unclear. He mentions not only that the
reference point of the "required balancing is not the gain of territory or other
advantage expected from the isolated action of a single unit, but the wider military
campaign," but also that the individual attacks have to be placed in their operative
context, which would indicate something narrower than "the wider military
campaign." Id.
131. See Bankovic Complaint, supra note 75.
132. Id.
133. See Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 54
(Decision on Admissibility of Dec. 19, 2001) (articulating the issue as whether the
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of the term "jurisdiction" in Article 1 of the Convention.' Applying
the rules of interpretation found in the 1969 Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties,' 35 the Court determined that the term
"jurisdiction" in Article I encompasses an essentially territorial
notion. 3 6 The Court, however, proceeded to acknowledge that nonterritorial bases of jurisdiction might be contemplated, although they
would be exceptional and require special justification. 3 7 The Court's
jurisprudence contains examples of jurisdiction beyond the purely
territorial, most notably, in the present context, the Loizidou Case. 3s
Hence, the Court needed to determine whether circumstances
applicants and their deceased relatives fell within the jurisdiction of the respondent
State as resulting from an "extra-territorial
act"),
available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?ltem=0&Action= Html&X=218042
346&Notice=O&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=O (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
134. See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 1, 312 U.N.T.S. 221 (1950) [hereinafter
European Convention].
135. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
136. See Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, paras. 16-18, 59-66 (applying relevant
international law to determine the meaning of the phrase "'within their
jurisdiction").
137. Seeid.para.61.
138. Loizidou v. Turkey, App. No. 15318/89, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1995) (analyzing
the right to peaceful enjoyment of property situated in the northern, Turkishoccupied
part
of
Cyprus),
available at
http://hudoc.echrcoe.int/
Hudocldoc/HEJUD/sift/505.txt (last visited Jan. 30, 2002). The Court found that
"the concept of 'jurisdiction' under [Article 1] is not restricted to the national
territory of the High Contracting Parties." Id. para. 62. The Court further observed
that "bearing in mind the object and purpose of the Convention, the responsibility
of a Contracting Party may also arise when as a consequence of military actionwhether lawful or unlawful-it exercises effective control of an area outside its
national territory."Id. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights similarly
found that:
[U]nder certain circumstances, the exercise of its jurisdiction over acts with
an extraterritorial locus will not only be consistent with but required by the
norms which pertain... [and] while [jurisdiction] most commonly refers to
persons within a state's territory, it may, under given circumstances, refer to
conduct with an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in
the territory of one state, but subject to the control of another state-usually
through the acts of the latter's agents abroad.
Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 109/99, para.37 (1999),
available at www.cidh.orglannualrep/99eng/Merits/UnitedStates 10.95 1.htm (last
visited Jan. 30, 2002).
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surrounding the bombing of the RTS were equally exceptional "such
that they amounted to the extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction by
' 39
a Contracting State."'
The Court determined that the required exceptional circumstances
were absent in the RTS bombing case, primarily by distinguishing it
from the Loizidou decision. 4 ° In Loizidou, Turkey's army had
exercised "effective control" over part of Cyprus. Generally, the
Court recognizes extra-territorial jurisdiction where the respondent
state, "through the effective control of the relevant territory and its
inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or
through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of
the territory, [exercises] all or some of the public powers normally to
be exercised by that Government."'' When the dicta from Louzidou
and other cases dealing with extra-territoriality are construed in this
manner, it becomes obvious that NATO did not exercise the requisite
"effective control.' 42
Furthermore, Cyprus is a party to the European Convention on
Human Rights. If Turkey's defacto control over the northern part of
Cyprus had not been held to bring that territory within the
jurisdiction of Turkey, the inhabitants of this part of Cyprus would
"have found themselves excluded from the benefits of the
Convention."'' 4 The F.R.Y., however, is not a party to the
139. Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, para. 74.
140. See id. para. 75 (distinguishing the "effective control" criteria established in
the Lozidou case).
141. Id. para. 71.
142. See Bankovic Complaint, supra note 75, paras. 75-89 (noting that the
applicants had, in part, argued that NATO control over Yugoslavia's air space
could be likened to Turkey's control over northern Cyprus, particularly since the
use of precision guided munitions gave the use of air power great impact on the
ground without using ground troops); Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, paras. 46-53
(discussing the submission of the applicants).
143. Cyprus v. Turkey, App. No. 25781/94, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 78 (2001)
(finding that if Turkey, a Contracting State, was not held to have jurisdiction
within the meaning of Article I due to its effective overall control, it would result
in a "regrettable vacuum in the system of human rights protection in the territory in
question by removing from individuals there the benefit of the Convention's
fundamental
safeguards... "),
available at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/
hudoc/ViewRoot.asp?ltem=0&Action=Html&X=218052618&Notice=0&Noticem
ode=&RelatedMode=0 (last visited Feb. 17, 2002). See Bankovic, App. No.
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Convention. Thus, the Court's decision to hold the Complaint
inadmissible does not deprive F.R.Y. civilians of rights they would
otherwise possess under the European Convention.
When considering extra-territorial jurisdiction, it is somewhat
unclear whether both "effective control," as stipulated under
Bankovic, and the loss of otherwise held rights must be present. This
arguably appears to be the case.'' Thus, the decision in the Bankovic
case appears to have closed the somewhat open-ended dictum
pertaining to extra-territorial exercise of jurisdiction found in the
Loizidou judgment.'45
In essence, the Court has now firmly limited the application of the
Convention to Europe.' 46 For example, if soldiers from a Contracting
State on a peace-keeping mission mistreat detained locals, it would
appear that the mistreated persons could not seek final redress
through the ECHR even if the mission resulted in "effective control"
outside Convention territory.' 47
One can debate whether such consequences are desirable or not.
As to the possible policy considerations behind the Court's decision,
one may suggest that the increasing use of national and international
tribunals to correct real and imagined wrongs may have played a
part. 148 Although all potential "extra-territorial complaints" would
52207/99, para. 80 (discussing the Cyprus case).
144. The Court's statement that 'the Convention was not designed to be applied
throughout the world, even in respect of the conduct of Contracting States' makes
little sense if the 'conduct' does not reach the level of 'effective control' and, thus,
indicates that both criteria have to be present in order to for a complaint to be
admissible under Article 1. See Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, para 80.
145. See Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, para 80.
146. See id. ("The Convention is a multi-lateral treaty operating ... in an
essentially regional context and notably in legal space (espace juridique) of the
Contracting States.").
147. In general, it appears questionable whether traditional peace-keeping
missions would entail "effective control," although this cannot be ruled out. As a
potential complaint scenario that would be excluded according to the present
analysis, one may consider the mistreatment of Somali civilians by both European
and Canadian forces in Somalia in 1992/93.
148. One need only consider the case of Belgium, where a number of cases have
been instigated against individuals, including Ariel Sharon, Yasser Arafat, Saddam
Hussein, and Fidel Castro. See Marlise Simons, Human Rights Cases Begin to
Flood into Belgium Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2001, at A8. The future of many
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not be considered frivolous, the ECHR may have had a realistic fear
of being inundated by complaints from around the world.
Furthermore, it is difficult to entirely dismiss the concern expressed
by the governments regarding possible consequences for future
collective military actions, including U.N. actions.'49
2. Human Rights Law and HumanitarianLaw
Since the Court found that Bankovic did not come within the
jurisdiction of the respondent states, the subsequent questions
become somewhat academic but still interesting: 1) which rights
protected by the Convention were in fact violated; and 2) how the
Court would examine this issue.
The right to life will briefly be considered. Initially, it may appear
surprising that an act of war or armed conflict such as the bombing
of the RTS can be evaluated under human rights standards. This
surprise is based on the traditional division between the
(international) law of peace and the (international) law of war, where
human rights belong to the former category. From a principled
perspective, however, an "integral linkage [exists] between the law
of human rights and humanitarian law because they share a 'common
nucleus of non-derogable rights and a common purpose of protecting
''
human life and dignity. 150
Moreover, this division is not apparent from a human rights
perspective and the European Convention from 1950 states explicitly
which rights may be derogated from during wartime and which will

of the cases pending in Belgium is uncertain following a recent I.C.J. judgment in
the Case Concerning the Arrest Warrant of II April 2000 (Democratic Republic or
the Congo v. Belgium). The I.C.J. found that Belgium "failed to respect the
immunity from criminal jurisdiction and the inviolability which the incumbent
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo enjoyed
under international law." See Judgment on Feb. 14, 2002, available at www.icj-

cij.org.
149. See Bankovic, App. No. 52207/99, para 43.
150. Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 109/99, para.37
(1999)
available
at
www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/
UnitedStates10.951.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2002) (quoting Abella v. Argentina,
Case 11.137, Inter. Am. C.H.R., No. 55/97, para. 158 (1997), available at
http://cidh.org/annualrep/97eng/97ench3a I0an.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002)).
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remain in effect.'

In addition, during the past decades, there has been an increasing
convergence between rules from human rights law and rules from
international humanitarian law. One author is able to date the
beginning of this development to the United Nations Human Rights
Conference in Teheran in 1968. In Teheran, international
humanitarian law was "transformed into a branch of human rights

law and termed 'human rights in armed conflicts .... I
Furthermore, post-Cold War developments have added to the
attraction of applying international humanitarian law to human
rights. One author noted "[t]he change in direction toward intrastate
or mixed conflicts-the context of contemporary atrocities-has
drawn humanitarian law in the direction of human rights law."' 53
Additionally, both the Inter-American and the European human
rights regimes have recently examined cases that included aspects of
armed conflict and international humanitarian law. '

Finally, any remaining doubt about the continued relevance of
human rights during war or armed conflict has been removed by the

151. See European Convention, supra note 134, art. 15.1 (stating that in times of
war or other public emergency, rights can be derogated to the extent that there is an
exigent situation). There is no derogation from Article 2 unless deaths result from
lawful acts of war. Id.
152.. See Christina M. Cerna, Huntan Rights in Armed Conflict: Implementation
of InternationalHumanitarianLaw Norms by'Regional Intergovernmental Human
Rights Bodies, in IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 3940 (Frits Kalshoven & Yves Sandoz eds., 1989).
153. Meron, supra note 91, at 244.
154. See Liesbeth Zegveld, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
and InternationalHumanitarianLaw: A Comment on the Tablada Case, 38 INT'L
REv. RED CROss 505 (1998) (discussing how the Commission decided to apply
international humanitarian law in a case concerning internal armed conflict);
Aisling Reidy, The Approach of the European Commission and Court of Human
Rights to International HumanitarianLaw; 38 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 513, 519
(1998) (analyzing how the ECHR has addressed international humanitarian law in
situations involving displacement of civilian populations, detention and treatment
of detainees, and conduct of military operations and unlawful killings); see also
David Weissbrodt & Beth Andrus, The Right to Life During Armed Conflict:
Disabled Peoples' International v. United States. 29 HARV. INT'L L. J. 59, 62
(1988) (suggesting that the Commission could apply principles of humanitarian
law to the U.S. military operation in Grenada, in which sixteen patients were
wounded at a mental institution).
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concerning nuclear weapons:
The Court observes that the protection of the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights does not cease in times of war, except by
operation of Article 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may be
derogated from in time of national emergency. In principle, the right not
arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also in hostilities. The test
of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life, however, then falls to be
determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in
armed conflict, which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities.
Thus whether a particular loss of life, through the use of a certain weapon
in warfare, is to be considered an arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to
Article 6 of the Covenant, can only be decided by reference to the law
applicable in armed conflict and not deduced from the terms of the
155
Covenant itself.

Confirming the continued relevance of human rights during armed
conflict, the International Court also emphasizes that the evaluation
of a potential violation of the right to life claim must be conducted
with reference to international humanitarian law. 5 6 This dicttmn
appears to fit well with Article 15 of the European Convention,
which deals with possible derogation from the rights protected by the

155. International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion, Legality of the Threat or
Use of Nuclear Weapons, para. 25 (July 8, 1996) [hereinafter Advisory Opinion]
available at www.icj-cij.org. (last visited Feb. 2, 2002).
156. See also Abella v. Argentina, Case 11.137, Inter. Am. C.H.R., No. 55/97,
para. 161 (1997) (quoting the Inter-American Commission on Hluman Rights as
stating, "the Commission must necessarily look to and apply definitional standards
and relevant rules of humanitarian law as sources of authoritative guidance in its
resolution of this and other kinds of claims alleging violations of the American
Convention
in
combat
situations"),
available
at
http://cidh.org/annualrep/97eng/97ench3at0an.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002); se.also Coard v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am. C.H.R. 109/99, para. 42
(1999) (stating that "the analysis of petitioner's claims under the Declaration
within their factual and legal context requires reference to international
humanitarian law, which is a source of authoritative guidance and provides the
specific normative standards which apply to conflict situations"), available at
www.cidh.org/annualrep/99eng/Merits/ UnitedStates10.951.htm (last visited Jan.
30, 2002). In Coard, for example, the Commission found that it had to refer to
international humanitarian law in order to determine whether the detention of
persons in the context of the United States's intervention in Grenada in 1983 was
arbitrary. Id.
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Convention. 5 7 According to Article 15, the right to life protected by
Article 2 is non-derogable during times of war or other public
emergencies, "except in respect of deaths resulting from lawful acts
of war."' 58 Determining the lawfulness of acts of war appears best
done according tojus in bello.

The ECHR has, on occasion, made implicit use of international
humanitarian law, most notably in cases concerning the situation in
southeastern Turkey.' 59 Aisling Reidy, however, finds that the Court
may be reluctant to make explicit references to international
humanitarian law, in spite of considering a humanitarian law context.
He notes that this reluctance might be due to the scarcity of cases
dealing with situations where international humanitarian law is
applicable, such as the one contained in the complaint against the
NATO member states.16
157. See id. art. 15.1 ("In time of war or other public emergency threatening the
life of the nation of any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating
from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the
exigencies of the situation.
158. Id. art. 15.2.
159. See, e.g., Ergi v. Turkey, No. 66.19971850/1057, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 80
(1998) (discussing the death of a villager in southeastern Turkey, and how the
Court was not convinced that the Turkish security forces directly caused the
death), available at http://www.echr.coe.int (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). The Court,
however, went on to examine the planning and conduct of the security operation
during which Havva Ergi was killed, and found that there was "no information to
indicate that any steps or precautions had been taken to protect the villagers." Id.
The Court emphasized that the responsibility of a state may be engaged where it
fails to "take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of a
security operation .... ." Id. para. 79 (emphasis added). The emphasized passage is
found in API, Article 57 (2, a, ii). The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights has made more explicit use of international humanitarian law. For example,
in the Tablada case, the Commission held it was competent to, and at times, had to
"apply directly rules of international humanitarian law or to inform its
interpretations of relevant provisions of the American Convention by reference to
these rules." Abella, Case 11.137, Inter. Am. C.H.R., No. 55197, para. 157.
160. See Reidy, supra note 154, at 516, 528 (noting that the potential for
enforcement of humanitarian law through the ECHR system has yet to be fully
exploited); see also European Court of Human Rights, Press Release, Luisa
DianantinaRomero de Ibanez and Roberto Guillermo Rojas %'.UK Inadmissible,
July
19,
2000,
available
at
http:/www.echr.coe.int.english/200/
jui%5Faug/belgrano.eng.htm (last visited Jan. 27, 2002). The case concerned the
sinking of the Argentinean cruiser General Belgrano on May 2, 1982, by British
naval forces during the Falkands War. Id. The Court found that the complaint had
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When considering the potential for the future application of
international humanitarian law before the European Court of Human
Rights, one must be mindful of the boundaries established in the
Bankovic decision, particularly in cases involving the right to life. , "
As part of their argument for admissibility, the applicants relied both
on the ordre public mission of the Convention and on Article 15 for
a broad understanding of the term jurisdiction.' 62 The Court,
however, dismissed both approaches and emphasized that the
Convention is a "constitutional instrument for European public
order" and that Article 15 must "be read subject to the 'jurisdiction'
limitation enumerated in Article I."63 Considering how narrowly the

Court construed the term "jurisdiction" with regard to extraterritorial acts, it seems doubtful that more traditional armed conflict
situations will reach the Court. If it is accepted that international
humanitarian law will only flourish at the European Court in such
traditional inter-state armed conflict situations, it appears unlikely
that international humanitarian law will play a substantive part in the
Court's judgments in the near future.

IV. THE ATTACK AT DJAKOVICA
One point of criticism directed at NATO's actions in OAF
concerned the altitude from which several NATO attacks were
conducted. The altitude was particularly central in the context of a
number of attacks near Djakovica on April 14, 1999. For several
days, the specific circumstances surrounding the attacks were in
dispute. Most observers now seem to agree that NATO aircraft
attacked one or more convoys of Albanian refugees due to mistaken
identification. As many as seventy-five civilians are believed to have
been killed. It is still unclear whether any, military vehicles were part

not been submitted within the six month allotted time period stipulated in ECIR,
Article 35(1).
161. See Bankovic v. Belgium, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., para. 85
(Decision on Admissibility of Dec. 19, 2001) (declaring that the applicant's
complaint was inadmissible), available at http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudoc/
ViewRoot.asp?Item=0&Action=Html&X=218042346&Notice=0&Noticemode-&
RelatedMode=O (last visited Feb. 17, 2002).
162. See id. paras. 49, 79.
163. Id. paras. 62, 80.
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of the convoy. It is reasonable to conclude, however, that the NATO
aircraft did not intentionally target the civilian convoys in order to hit
the refugees, even if the OTP Report does mention one source
believing this to be the case.I6M
The important question is not whether the convoy constituted a
military target, but rather, whether NATO took sufficient precautions
in order to determine and verify that the target was legitimate.
According to the API, Article 57(2)(a)(i), those who plan or decide
upon an attack shall inter alia do "everything feasible to verify that
the objectives to be attacked are neither civilians nor civilian
objects. ..161 The difficulties connected to the interpretation of the
word "feasible" are legion. 66 At the time of ratification, a number of
countries entered their understanding of the word, understanding the
term "everything feasible" to mean "everything that was practicable
or practically possible, taking into account all the circumstances at
the time of the attack, including those relevant to the success of
military operations."' 167 The API Commentary emphasizes that the
general reference to "the success of military operations" involves a
risk of depriving the rule of any significant normative content.'"
The API Commentary itself does not attempt to formulate any
precise definition and merely states that any interpretation is
fundamentally a question of "common sense and good faith.' ' +
Concerning the obligation to distinguish and the altitude of fifteen
thousand feet, the OTP Report found that "[t]he fifteen thousand feet
minimum altitude adopted for part of the campaign may have meant
that the target could not be verified with the naked eye". It appears,
however, "that with the use of modem technology, the obligation to

164. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 66 (stating that the OTP has a source

that alleges to have recorded a conversation that would establish that the attack on
the convoy was deliberate even though the pilot knew it was comprised of
civilians).
165. ProtocolL supra note 64, art. 57 (2)(a)(i).
166. See infra notes 167-169 and accompanying text (analyzing the difficulty of
defining the term "feasible").
167. ICRC API Commentari', supra note 34, para. 2198 (discussing different

delegations' interpretation of the words "everything feasible").
168. Id.
169

Id-
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distinguish was effectively carried out in the vast majority of cases
during the bombing campaign."' 7 ° This finding naturally leads one to
question to what extent the obligation to distinguish was respected in
7
the residual small minority of cases.' '
Regarding the attack at Djakovica, there was at least some doubt
about what was observed on the ground. "NATO itself claimed that
although the cockpit video showed the vehicles to look like tractors,
when viewed with the naked eye from the attack altitude they
appeared to be military vehicles." ' If one indicator, the video,
conveyed one thing and the other indicator, the eye of the pilot,
conveyed something else, it would be fair to conclude that there was
some degree of doubt about what was being observed. Interestingly,
the OTP Report implicitly commends NATO for suspending the
attack as soon as the presence of civilians was "suspected."' 7 '
According to this rendition, attacks are apparently allowed if there is
doubt, as long as the attackers do not actually "suspect" civilian
presence. Here, suspicion would seem to demand some cognition
beyond mere doubt. Such an understanding goes against the general
principle found in the API. For example, Articles 50(1) and 52(3)
hold that in case of doubt, persons and objects are presumed to be
74
civilian in nature. 1

A. PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES

The OTP Report failed to evaluate the legality of the individual
attack near Djakovica. The Report dismisses the idea that precautions
taken, or not taken, can be judged with reference to "a specific
incident" and proceeds to determine that to the extent "precautionary
measures have worked adequately in a high percentage of cases then
the fact they have not worked well in a small number of cases does

170. OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 56.
171. See Benvenuti, supra note 33, at 519 (explaining that in the majority of
cases, the use of modem technology enhanced the obligation to distinguish
between civilian and military targets) (emphasis added).
172. OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 67.
173. See id. para. 70.
174. See Protocol I, supra note 64, arts. 50(l), 52(3) (setting forth provisions
that distinguish civilian people and objects from military targets).
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not necessarily mean they are generally inadequate."' 7 5 This
interpretation of international humanitarian law is, of course, a
perfect fit with the overall findings of the OTP Report concerning the
NATO air campaign.
This statement is problematic for several reasons. First, it allows
the attacker, in this case NATO, to excuse a few transgressions or
mistakes as long as they are seen in a sufficiently broad perspective.
Such an approach may, as noted by Paolo Benvenuti, lead to the
misconception that "war crimes occur and should be prosecuted only
if committed in the context of a plan or of a large-scale commission,
when the inadequacy of precautionary measures is deliberate on the
part of the warring party."' 7 6 Benvenuti adds that "it is only when
each attack is considered in its specific circumstances that it is
possible to say whether or not all practicable precautions have been
taken and whether or not the attack constitutes a breach of
[international humanitarian law].' 77
Second, even if the statement on the surface may generally appear
7
to be correct, it cannot possibly be correct at any given time.1 1
Consider, for example, an attack against a railroad bridge, which is
considered to be a legitimate military target. Prior to the attack, a
number of precautions are taken, but at no point is the train schedule
consulted. Assume ten of such bridges are attacked. The first nine
attacks are carried out smoothly with no collateral damage because
no trains were close to the bridges at the time of the attacks. During
the tenth and final attack, a train happens to be on the bridge. Can
we, based on the dictum of the OTP Report, conclude that since
everything went well in nine of ten cases, that sufficient precaution

175. OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 29.
176. Benvenuti, supra note 33, at 515.
177. Id.
178. See id. at 514-515. Benvenuti comments:
Certainly, everybody agrees that, if precautionary measures have worked well
in a small number of cases, it does not necessarily mean that they are
generally inadequate. But the Committee forgets to stress that the corollary is
also true: if the precautionary measures have worked adequately in a very
high percentage of cases, this does not mean that they are generally adequate,
so as to excuse violations occurring in a small number of cases.
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had been taken? It would appear so, but is this legally correct? If the
final attack had been the first, it would have been obvious that the
precautions had been insufficient.
In a similar fashion, we may consider attacks carried out from an
altitude of fifteen thousand feet. Assume ten attacks take place.
Assume, also, that a number of precautions have been taken, but in
reality the pilots are unable to determine positively whether the
convoy on the ground contains civilian vehicles. In nine of the ten
cases, it turns out that the convoys consisted solely of military
vehicles. The tenth convoy attacked, however, was civilian. Can we
conclude that because the first nine convoys happened to be military,
that the attackers had fulfilled their obligations under Article 57 of
the API?
What consequences do these deliberations have for a legal
evaluation of the NATO attack near Djakovica? Amnesty
International posits that the decision by NATO to conduct attacks
from an altitude of fifteen thousand feet "may well have contributed
to an indiscriminate attack, in breach of international humanitarian
law."

1 79

Similarly, Human Rights Watch concludes that the fact that
NATO subsequently altered its procedures "indicates that the
alliance recognized that it had taken insufficient precautions in
mounting this attack, in not identifying the civilians present, and in
assuming that the intended targets were legitimate military objectives
rather that in positively identifying them."' 80
The Report from the OTP finds that the altitude, combined with
other circumstances, such as the speed of the aircraft, make it
difficult for the crew to distinguish civilian from military vehicles.''

179. AMNESTY REPORT, supra note 24, § 5.3.
180. HRW REPORT, supra note 8, at 23 (quoting a NATO officer, after the
incident, as stating that "we got to be very, very cautious about striking objects
moving on the roads"). Another NATO officer is quoted as stating that "if military
vehicles were intermingled with civilian vehicles, they were not to be attacked, due
to the collateral damage." Id. Despite these directives, the attack was still carried
out and the above commentary by NATO officers shows that they believed the
precautions were insufficient. Id.
181. See OTP Report, supra note 18, para. 69 ("[I]t is difficult for any aircrew
operating an aircraft flying at several hundred miles an hour and at a substantial
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The Report concluded that the crew would have benefited from
8 2 The Report,
observing the potential target from a lower altitude.1
however, does not find proof of recklessness, which is a requirement
for criminal prosecution. 183
One may read the OTP deliberation as an implicit confirmation
that NATO violated Article 57 of the API, but that the nlens rea
failed to qualify the violation for prosecution.'
If this reading is
accepted, the three reports concur regarding this specific incident.
Yet, to the detriment of the OTP Report and the future of
international humanitarian law, clear conclusions are never drawn.
B. MORE MORAL CONSIDERATIONS
In addition to the preceding lex lata observations, it may be
worthwhile to contribute a few ethical or lexferenda considerations,
which may assist in the interpretation of the elusive demands of
Article 57185 Each mission flown or each attack conducted involves
a certain risk of unwanted casualties, such as casualties among
friendly forces or among civilians. As proven during Operation
Allied Force, the risk may not materialize very often. It is often
possible to shift the risk between the NATO pilot and the civilian on
the ground. If the pilot flies at a high altitude, he reduces the risk to
himself, but civilians on the ground become harder to identify.'" The
risk, by contrast, is shifted towards the pilot if he flies low in order to
87
make a positive identification of the target.'
height to distinguish between military and civilian vehicles.").
182. See id. para. 70.
183. See id. paras. 69-70 (declining to prosecute NATO based upon the

Djakovica bombing).
184. See id. (failing to find the requisite degree of recklessness to warrant a

recommendation to prosecute).
185. See Protocol I, supra note 64, art. 57 (requiring armed forces to "take all

feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to
avoiding . . . injury to civilians and damage to civilian objects").
186. See generally OTP Report, supra note 18, paras. 69-70 (recognizing the
tension between the pilot's decision to fly at a high altitude in order to avoid
detection and the need to fly low in order to minimize civilian casualties).
187. See CLARK, supra note 6, at 183. In addition to the obvious concern for the
life of the individual pilot, General Clark's determination not to lose any aircraft
was also guided by strategic concerns:

[17:765
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These considerations are valid in any armed conflict. Michael
Waltzer, for one, describes a similar situation during the Korean
War. There, the specific question concerned whether to employ
artillery against suspected enemy positions with a high risk of
civilian casualties, or to send out a patrol in order to identify enemy
positions more precisely. He writes:
Even if the proportions work out favorably [i.e., only limited civilian
casualties] ... we would still want to say, I think, that the patrol must be

sent out, the risk accepted, before the big guns are brought to bear. The
soldiers sent on patrol can plausibly argue that they never chose to make
war in Korea; they are soldiers nevertheless; there have obligations that
go with their war rights, and the first of these is the obligation to attend to
the rights of civilians-more
precisely, of those civilians whose lives they
1 88
themselves endanger.

Deliberations such as these are now partly guided by API. In
reality, however, the partial guidance only helps to solve the easy
questions and lets the subtle situations such as the example from
Kosovo go unresolved. Based on deliberations outlined above, which
conclude that radio stations can be legitimate targets in cases where
they incite genocide, one may also consider whether jus ad bellum

If I wanted to keep this campaign going indefinitely, we had to protect our air
fleet. Nothing would hurt us more with public opinion than headlines that
screamed "NATO LOSES TEN AIRPLANES IN TWO DAYS." Take losses
like that, divide it into the total number of aircraft committed, and the time
limits of the campaign would be clear.
Id. However, whether the flying altitude is determined by concerns for the
individual pilot, or is based on strategic concerns, or a combination of the two, it is
immaterial for both the legal and moral evaluation.
188. MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS:

A

MORAL ARGUMENT

155 (1991). Michael Ignatieff stated:
High tech warfare is governed by two constraints - avoiding civilian
casualties and a avoiding risks to pilots - that are in direct contradiction. To
target effectively you have to fly low. If you fly low, you lose pilots. Fly high
and you get civilians. Low flying Apache helicopters could both target ethnic
cleansers and avoid civilian casualties, but by week six the alliance had not
even approved their deployment in Kosovo, believing the risks to crews from
ground fire were still too high. As the campaign went onto its second month,
the alliance's moral preferences were clear: Preserving the lives of their allvolunteer service professionals was a higher priority than saving innocent
foreign civilians.
IGNATIEFF, supra note 38, at 62.

WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS
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considerations may assist the interpretation ofjus in bello rules in the
present case. If an attack on a radio station can be justified by in
nzajore minus, the following parallel appears appropriate to draw: if
Operation Allied Force is legally justified as a humanitarian
intervention, i.e., to save the Kosovar-Albanian population, it would

be hard to justify an allocation of the risk of casualties onto the
Kosovar-Albanian population in order to avoid losses among NATO
pilots.
The OTP Report makes references to similar deliberations. The
Report finds that "the application of the definition [of a military
target] to particular objects may also differ depending on the scope
and objectives of the conflict."'8 9 These latter "objectives" may be
presumed to be closely intertwined with the reasons for the initiation
of Operation Allied Force, i.e.,jus ad belhun. It is, however, doubtful
whether this OTP statement lends itself to the interpretation proposed
here. As Michael Bothe observes, the OTP Report fails to investigate
the question of whether:
Traditional considerations of military necessity and military advantage
have a legitimate place in a conflict the declared purpose of which is a

humanitarian one, namely to promote the cause of human rights. The
thought would deserve further consideration that in such type of a

conflict, more severe restraints would be imposed on the choice of
military targets and of balancing test applied for the purposes of the

proportionality principle that in a normal armed conflict.190

The Independent International Commission on Kosovo
("Commission") submitted a proposal with a similar interpretation.
The Commission advocates that the International Red Cross draft a
new convention to cover military operations during humanitarian
interventions that would restrain the use of force to a further degree
than what is currently permitted under the laws of armed conflict. 9 '

189. OTP Report, supra note 18. para. 37.
190. Bothe, supra note 40, at 535.
191. See THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 10, at 184 ("A less ambitious

alternative, recommended by Amnesty International, would be to accept stricter
adherence to the existing standards in international law, particularly as already

embodied in Protocol I.").
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CONCLUSION
When the member states of NATO decided to initiate Operation
Allied Force, few governments probably contemplated that they
risked defending their actions before an international court. The
increasing presence and importance of international courts appear to
be the way of the future, whether one likes it or not.' The ICTY is
one court before which NATO leaders will not have to appear.
Although the Court clearly had jurisdiction, the prosecutor at the
Court decided to follow the advice of the Committee that no formal
investigation be initiated.' 93 Even if one is inclined to agree with the
conclusion of the OTP Report, it is very difficult to accept the
reasoning and the ambiguities of the Report.' 94 An inability or
unwillingness to determine the facts, as well as a subsequent inability
to apply legal rules to those facts, mars the OTP Report.
The aversion to drawing concrete and firm conclusions has further
consequences beyond bringing peace of mind to NATO leaders.'
As W.J. Fenrick notes, "to the extent the media is identified as a
separate target category, Operation Allied Force may represent an
attempt to broaden rather than narrow the range of objects regarded
as lawful military objectives." ' 9 6 The OTP Report did not retard such
a development, which it could have done by clearly stating that
television stations are not military targets unless they fulfill the
criteria in API, Article 52(2). Deliberations concerning the targeting

192. See Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction. 80 FOREIGN
AFF. 86 (2001) ("[A]n unprecedented movement has emerged to submit
international politics to judicial procedures."); see also Kenneth Roth, The Case
for Universal Jurisdiction, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 150, 151-53 (2001) (discussing the
benefits of the growing international judicial system).
193. See generally OTP Report, supra note 18 (declining to recommend the
prosecution of NATO leaders before the ICTY).
194. See Natalino Ronzitti, Is the Non Liquet of the Final Report by the
Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign Against the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia Acceptable?, 82 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 1017-28
(2000) (setting forth a critique, different from the present, of the OTP's reasoning
in deciding not to recommend the prosecution of alleged NATO war crimes).
195. See General Wesley Clark, Remarks at a Book Signing in Washington,
D.C. (July 17, 2001) (indicating that General Clark finds that the OTP Report
"exonerated" NATO).
196. Fenrick, supra note 7, at 495.
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of television stations tie in with broader discussions regarding the use
of military force.
During Operation Allied Force, many Americans advocated more
substantial attacks on strategic targets in Serbia, including in Serbian
cities. This advocacy is connected to recent theories about the use of
air power to target the infrastructure of the enemy state. As J.W.
Crawford comments, potential consequences would be "the indirect
targeting of the civilian population, euphemistically referred to as
'popular support." ' 97 This development might be effective from a
military point of view, but it is hardly recommendable from a
humanitarian point of view. Even if the OTP Report did not intend to
encourage the trend toward broadening the range of lawful military
targets, the equivocal findings of the Report do not impede such a
finding. 198
Furthermore, the Report's interpretation of the principle of
proportionality is detrimental to humanitarian concerns. The wide
interpretation of what should be included in the evaluation of the
expected military advantage threatens the normative restraint of the
principle of proportionality. Even if it is agreed that an evaluation of
each individual attack would be too narrow, the logic of the OTP
Report seems irreconcilable with reasonable humanitarian
considerations.
Moreover, in light of the conclusions drawn here, it would have
been preferable if the OTP had conducted a formal investigation. On
the whole, there seems to be enough doubt to warrant such a formal
investigation, and the doubt should not necessarily benefit NATO in

197. J.W. Crawford, The Law of Noncombatant Innunity and the Targeting of"
National ElectricalPower Si'stems, 21 FLETCHER FORUM OF WORLD AFF. 101-102

(1997) (discussing the debate of military necessity, targets, and proportionality of
attacks).
198. See THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 10, at 179 (finding that targeting

infrastructure and other facilities considered basic to civilian survival is
"questionable under the Geneva Conventions [of 1949] and Protocol I [API]." but
has been consistently practiced in wartime since World War i). In this context, it

is regrettable that the OTP Report does not stand firm on legal protection. See
Peter Rowe, Kosovo 1999: The Air Campaign-lla'ethe Provisions o 'A(ditional
Protocol I Withstood the Test?. 837 INTr'L. REV. RED CROSS 147 (2000)
(discussing how the conflict in Kosovo did not fit "within those types of armed

conflict envisaged by the drafters of Additional Protocol 1...1).
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the present circumstances. 199 Finally, additional and necessary facts,
which were clearly absent from the OTP Report in spite of assertions
to the contrary, could have been established and some of the
problematic interpretations could have been challenged and
amended.

199. See THE Kosovo REPORT, supra note 10, at 184 ("NATO succeeded better
than any air war in history in selective targeting that adhered to principles of
discrimination, proportionality, and necessity, with only relatively minor breaches
that were themselves reasonable interpretations of 'military necessity' in
context."). The Commission also accepted the final view of the OTP Report "that
there is no basis in available evidence for charging specific individuals with
criminal violations of the laws during the NATO campaign. Nevertheless, some
practices do seem vulnerable to the allegation that violations might have occurred,
and depend for final assessment upon the availability of further evidence." Id.

